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ABSTRACT: In bankruptcy, creditors exercise governance rights over a debtor
firm-they vote to accept or reject a proposed plan of reorganization. These
governance rights are apportioned based on the amount of a creditor's claim:
"one dollar, one vote." This allocation assumes a claim reflects the creditor's
true economic interest in the debtor, and the creditor is thus presumed to use
its governance rights in the bankruptcy to maximize the value of the debtor,
and hence its claim.
Yet a creditor's financial interest is not always limited or even linked to the
face amount of its claim. For example, the interest of employee creditors extends
beyond recovering back pay to ensuring future employment, while a landlord 's
interest may be less in recovering back rent than in being able to terminate a
lease so it can relet the property at a higher rate. Historically, this has been a
discrete and manageable problem. Two recent developments in financial
markets, however, have made the mismatch between a creditor's total economic
interests and its claim-and the concomitant governance rights-more
problematic.
First, a robust market has arisen in distressed debt, enabling investors to
purchase bankruptcy claims-and thus governance rights-at a discount.
Second, the emergence of derivatives markets now enables investors to go
"short" on the debtor and benefit from its misfortune. Combined, these
developments enable investors to cheaply acquire governance rights in
bankruptcy and then use that power to further the value of their extraneous
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interests rather than maximizing the value of their bankruptcy claim. As a
result, the "one dollar, one vote" principle underlying bankruptcy governance
is now in question.
This Article illustrates problems that result from the divergence of economic
interests and governance rights in bankruptcy. It shows that existing
bankruptcy law tools, such as disclosure, vote designation, trading bars,
equitable subordination, and equitable disallowance, fail to provide adequate
remedies for the problems. Accordingly, we propose an administrable system of
"mark-to-market governance," in which the governance rights, but not the
economic distribution rights, associated with a creditor's bankruptcy claim
would be adjusted to rejlect the creditor's true net economic position. Under
mark-to-market governance, hedgers and shorts would be subject to
proportional dilution, claims purchasers would have their governance rights
discounted based on purchase price, and secured creditors would have their
credit bidding rights limited to the value of their collateral. Together these
adjustments will promote the core bankruptcy policies of maximizing the value
of the debtor firm and equitably distributing its value.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is a system for maximizing, realizing, and fairly distributing
the value of a failed firm to its stakeholders. In Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code an independent and disinterested trustee liquidates the debtor firm.,
Secured creditors are paid from the proceeds of their collateral, and any
1. 1i U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
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remaining realized value is distributed among unsecured creditors and equity
holders according to a prescribed statutory waterfall.2 Because the Chapter 7
liquidation system is nondiscretionary, it establishes a distributional baseline
and raises relatively few governance questions.
In contrast, Chapter 11 provides a mechanism for restructuring a firm as
a going concern.3 Governance questions abound because the firm needs to
continue operating while in bankruptcy, while simultaneously formulating a
plan for its post-bankruptcy operations and determining how to compensate
the various stakeholders. How can the value of the firm be maximized? How
should it be allocated? How should asset-based priority be determined when
the assets are not being sold? If the firm is not liquidated, how does the
Bankruptcy Code allocate any asset value or going-concern value created or
preserved by the bankruptcy process?4
To address these strategic and distributional questions, Chapter 11
implements a governance regime that allows pre-bankruptcy managers to
remain in control as debtors-in-possession ("DIP"), but gives creditors and
other interested parties greater voice in any decisions outside "the ordinary
course of business."5 During the case, creditors may challenge the DIP's
actions as inconsistent with "business judgment."6 But, most importantly, at
the end of the case, creditors (and equity holders) have a vote on whether to
accept or reject a plan.7 In theory this vote allows stakeholders to express their
preferences on how best to maximize firm value and to negotiate as to how
that value should be allocated. The Chapter i i negotiation takes place against
the backdrop of certain statutory minima-the hypothetical liquidation value
creditors would receive in Chapter 7 and the "fair and equitable" (also known
as "cramdown") standard.'
A fundamental assumption of Chapter il's distributional and
governance schemes are that a stakeholder's economic interest in the debtor
is reflected in the face amount of its claim, and that it will act accordingly.
2. Id. §§ 725-726.
3. Seeid.§§122-1129.
4. Chapter ii improves on compulsory state process in a variety of ways. It can improve
recovery on assets by facilitating a value-maximizing sale, and it can preserve the value of
operations by keeping the business alive as its capital structure is remade. For a more detailed
discussion of entitlements to this "Bankruptcy-Code-created value" and how it should be
allocated, see Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in
Chapter ii Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 892-95,916-26 (2014); and Melissa B.Jacoby & Edward
J.Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter i i, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 682-87
(2018) [hereinafterJacoby &Janger, Tracing Equity].
5. 1 U.S.C. § 363(c).
6. See, e.g., In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 BR. 5o6, 507-08 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (raising
objection to debtor's decision to bale hay instead of cubing it).
7. 1i U.S.C. §§ 1126, 129(a)(8), 1g29(a)(io). In bankruptcy jargon, creditors have
"claims" against the debtor and equity holders have "interests" in the debtor. We generally refer
to creditors in this Article as a catchall phrase for all financial stakeholders.
8. Id. §§ 1 x29(a) (7), 1129(b).
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Distribution of value to an individual unsecured creditor is allocated pro-rata,
in proportion to the total amount of debt in the class.9 This same pro-rata
principle is implemented for governance rights through the principle of "one
dollar, one vote."1o While Chapter 1 1 contains a variety of other statutory
protections for creditors and other financial stakeholders,I many are aimed
at preserving the integrity of the vote, which is arguably the creditors' most
important protection.2
The "one dollar, one vote" principle is simple, and can be viewed as a
corollary to the principle of equal (or pan passu) treatment.'s Where a class
of creditors' rights are unimpaired, they have no standing to object to plan
confirmation and no right to vote. 4 But if a class is not being made whole,
the distributional burden should be shared proportionally-and so should
decision-making power. If a creditor is owed $20 million, and the plan of
reorganization proposes paying lo% of the face amount of the claims, that
creditor will receive $2 million as a distribution. If there are a total of $80
million in unsecured claims outstanding, that creditor's distribution will
represent one-quarter of the assets distributed. That same creditor will also
control one-quarter of the votes that decide whether that class will accept the
proposed plan.
The assumption that underlies giving creditors governance rights is that
the interests of the creditor and the firm are aligned-that the creditor's
motivating economic interest is maximizing its recovery on that $20 million
claim. The Code assumes that creditors are "long" and favor a larger recovery
for the creditor's class, or at least that they are not "short," meaning that the
creditor would, because of extraneous interests, prefer a smaller recovery
from the debtor or the liquidation of the debtor firm.
The alignment between claim and economic interest has never been
perfect: creditors with similar legal rights may see things differently. For
example, suppliers and bondholders may take different views of how to
9. Id. §§726(b), 1123(a)(4), 1129(a)(7).
10. See id. § 1126(c). To be more specific, the Code requires two majorities: one-half in
number and two-thirds in amount. Id. In one case it is one claim, one vote. In the other it is one
dollar, one vote. As a practical matter, it is usually the two-thirds figure that comes into play.
11. See, e.g., id. §§ 1122, 1123(a)(4), 1 125, 1129(a)(1)-(3), 1129(a)(7), 1129(a)(9),
1129(a)(1i), 1129(b). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently affirmed the importance of
maintaining the integrity of the plan process. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973,986 (2017) ("[T]he distributions at issue here more closely resemble proposed transactions that
lower courts have refused to allow on the ground that they circumvent the Code's procedural
safeguards.").
12. See infra text accompanying note 216. Section i 125 assures adequate disclosure, and§ 1126 deals specifically with the voting process. See i 1 U.S.C. §§ 1 125-1126.
13. The pai passu principle is often attributed to Lord Mansfield, who famously said, "The
policy of the bankrupt law introduced by 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, and followed ever since, is to level all
creditors, who have not actually recovered satisfaction, or got hold of a pledge which the
bankrupt could not defeat." Worseley v. De Mattos (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 416 (KB).
14. 11 U.S.C.§§ 1124, 1126(f), 1129(a)(7), 1129(a)(8), 1129 (b)(1).
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maximize value: one hoping for future business from the debtor; the other
hoping to maximize the immediate return on their bonds. Unlike
bondholders, suppliers may be willing to take greater losses on existing debts
in order to ensure the survival of a customer. Furthermore, creditors have
long been able to separate their economic interest from their voting power in
other ways: through investments in the debtor's competitors or by holding
multiple interests across the capital structure.
As a result of these issues, there have always been some basic procedures
in place to remedy conflicts of interest and to punish bad behavior.5 These
include separate classification, vote designation, and equitable subordination.
The advent of modern financial derivatives and the increased liquidity of
distressed debt markets present a serious challenge to the existing safeguards
in three ways: (1) by making it easier for creditors to take economic positions
that run counter to the stated face amount of their claims; (2) by making it
easier to accumulate control, and/or blocking positions at a discount; and
(3) by making these facts considerably less transparent.
First, modern derivative instruments, such as options and credit default
swaps, enable investors with significant claims to construct positions that link
significant voting power to economic positions that are indifferent or even
economically "short."' 6 These investors are often called "empty creditors," in
that their voting rights are not tied to their economic interest.'7 Indeed, when
such empty creditors are economically "short," they may actually profit from
the firm's further misfortune, and, because of their voting rights, may have
the power to bring such misfortune about.
For example, a creditor can transfer the economic risk-the
distributional rights-on a bankruptcy claim to a third-party through the
purchase of a (transferrable) swap that guaranties the purchaser a fixed
return. The value of this swap to the purchaser/creditor increases as the value
of the creditor's distributional rights in the bankruptcy decline. Thus, the risk
of what the debtor will pay out on a $i million bankruptcy claim can be offset
by a swap for $i million (minus the cost of the swap). The swap will pay the
purchaser the difference or "spread" between the face amount of the claim
($i million), and the actual distribution. The "spread" increases as the value
of the bankruptcy distribution falls. For example, if the bankruptcy
distribution on the $1 million claim is $400,000, then the swap will pay
$6oo,ooo, while if the bankruptcy distribution is only $200,000, then the swap
will pay $8oo,ooo. The decrease in the value of the distributional rights from
the claim will be offset by the increase in value of the swap: a $i million swap
operates as a hedge against the credit risk associated with $i million claim.
15. See infra Sections IV.A-.D.
i6. See, e.g., Samuel M. Kidder, Comment, What's Your Position? Amending the Bankruptcy
Disclosure Rules to Keep Pace with Financial Innovation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 803, 807 (201 1).
I 7. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling: An Overview, M&A
LAw., Apr. 2008, at 1, 5-
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Unlike insurance, however, a swap need not be tied to an "insurable
interest." A swap can be used to make a bet, unlinked to any economic interest
in the debtor whatsoever. The swap purchaser need not be a creditor. A so-
called "naked" credit default swap that is unmatched to an actual economic
interest is an economically "short" bet on creditworthiness of the firm.
Naked shorts are not inherently problematic. A "short" that is unlinked
to an actual economic interest in the firm does not directly affect the firm
-though it may have an indirect effect.' 8 More importantly, a short that is
unlinked to any power to influence the firm does not affect the firm's
decision-making processes. When, however, an economically short interest is
linked to the power to influence the firm, mischief may ensue.'1 For example,
if a creditor has a claim against the debtor sufficient to block the confirmation
of a plan of reorganization, and the creditor purchases swap protection in an
amount greater than the face amount of the claim, then the combined
positions leave the investor net "short." Thus, the risk associated with the
payout on a $i million claim (which will almost never be more than $i
million, unless, for some reason, the claim was purchased above par) can be
more than offset by a swap based on a $3 million fixed payment. The result is
that the claimant will have an incentive to exercise its control rights to harm
the debtor in order to maximize its return on the swap.
The second challenge is a product of the liquidity of distressed debt in
modern commercial markets. Modern claims trading now makes it easier for
incumbent creditors and even third parties to purchase debt in order to
accumulate a control position. Accounts receivable have always been freely
assignable.2o Contractual debt can be embodied in negotiable instruments,
which are both freely assignable,2' and transferred in physical form as
i8. Short derivative positions can indirectly impact firms. The nature of credit default swaps
is that for one party to go short, it needs to be paired with another investor that wants to go long.
This means that there are two ways of going long on a firm, directly and derivatively, so there will
be opportunities to arbitrage between the two types of long positions. Accordingly, the greater
the short demand there is in the swap market, the greater the price that one can get for taking
the long position in a swap. That in turn exerts a downward effect on the market price of the
direct long position. In and of itself, this has no effect other than to create short pressure on a
firm, but in certain circumstances, it can affect firm behavior. Thus, during the housing bubble
in the United States in the 2000s, short demand for swaps had the ironic effect of temporarily
pumping up housing prices. See generally Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the
Housing Bubble, too GEO. L.J. I 177 (2012) (explaining the impact that short derivative positions
have on firms). In order for mortgage lenders to compete for the business of longs with the swaps
market, they had to offer ever higher yields, which mean making ever riskier mortgages, which
had the short-term effect of expanding housing credit and boosting housing prices. See id. at
1244-49-
19. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69 for an egregious example.
20. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 13-101 (Mckinney 2019) (stating actions unrelated to personal
injury are freely assignable); U.C.C. § 9-406(d), (f) (AM. LAwINST. & UNIF. ILAw COMM'N 2000).
21. U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (i) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2002).
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property.2 2 Indeed, legal doctrines such as "holder in due course"23 and
federal programs that guarantee residential mortgages or bank deposits are
designed to enhance the value of debt transferred as property.
2 4 Lending and
information technology, have, however, both greased the wheels.
Sophisticated swaps and derivatives, coupled with mechanisms for
transferring claims quickly and cheaply have changed the landscape. 25
Bankruptcy is no different. Debt and equity continue to trade freely even
after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy. The automatic stay that enjoins most
collection efforts against the debtor does not interfere with a creditor's right
under non-bankruptcy law to assign its claim.2 6 Bankruptcy law requires only
registration of the transfer of a claim; the court does not police such transfers
or record the price.27 The ability to buy and sell bankruptcy claims means that
investors can simply buy claims and acquire both distributional rights and
governance rights. Derivatives, in turn, make the economic interest associated
with such positions less transparent because a party's derivative holdings, and
hence net economic interest, are not generally publicly observable.
22. Id. §3-201.
23. Id. §§3-302, 3-305-3-306.
24. EdwardJ. Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement: Transparency Cost, Risk Alteration, and
Coordination Problems, 4 BROOK.J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39, 46 (2oog); Adam J. Levitin & Susan
M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. i I 1 1, 1 14 1 (201 3).
25. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH Boys: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014) (providing
extreme examples of swaps impacting the economic landscape).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
27. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3oo. The rule does not even require timely registration of the
transfer. See id.
While the 1983 comment to Rule 3001 (e) reflected a concern with claims trading, the
1991 amendments were expressly intended to limit the role of the court in policing transfers of
claims, making it clear that no statement of the consideration paid was required. Id. The original
comment to Rule 3 oo 1(e) states:
Subdivision (e). . . .The interests of sound administration are served by requiring the
post-petition transferee to file with the proof of claim a statement of the transferor
acknowledging the transfer and the consideration for the transfer. Such a disclosure
will assist the court in dealing with evils that may arise out of post-bankruptcy traffic
in claims against an estate.
Id. Advisory Committee's Note to 1983 Amendment.
The requirement of a statement of consideration was removed, however, in 1991, with the
Advisory Committee Report stating as follows:
Subdivision (e) is amended to limit the court's role to the adjudication of disputes
regarding transfers of claims. If a claim has been transferred prior to the filing of a
proof of claim, there is no need to state the consideration for the transfer or to
submit other evidence of the transfer. . . . In that event, the clerk should note the
transfer without the need for court approval. If a timely objection is filed, the court's
role is to determine whether a transfer has been made that is enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law. This rule is not intended either to encourage or discourage
postpetition transfers of claims . . . .
Id. Advisory Committee's Note to 1991 Amendment.
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To be sure, claims trading is not all bad. Indeed, it may often be good. As
a "behavioral" matter, a claims trader who buys at $2o and sells at $30 feels
different having gained $1o and may negotiate with clearer eyes than a
creditor who loaned $ioo and is losing $70.28 Similarly, the availability of an
economic exit through a liquid market for claims may make the debt itself
more valuable, and may thus reduce the cost of credit. 9 On the other hand,
to the extent that claims carry with them voting rights, they also create the
ability to transfer control. Therefore, the ability to buy into a bankruptcy
provides an opportunity to buy control on the cheap-at least relative to the
pre-distress creditors. Moreover, the seller of a control block may be able to
sell that control at a premium-a control premium.
Thus, we have identified two potentially problematic types of creditors,
at least from the perspective of "one-dollar, one-vote." The first type is a
creditor that benefits from the debtor's failure-a short. Neither of us is tall,
so we have never liked the derogatory term "shorts." Therefore, we borrow
the word "Schadenfreude"-taking pleasure in the misfortune of others-from
German to describe as "Schadenfreude investors" those who wish for (and
benefit from) the misfortune of the debtor. The second type is the creditor
who has purchased control on the cheap and wishes to throw its weight
around-a bargain basement bully (hereinafter, just a "bully").
The difference is important. A Schadenfreude investor has made a bet on
a particular distributional outcome-the economic interest. A bully, by
contrast is concerned with power-governance. Separately, neither is
particularly problematic. However, there is yet a third type of problematic
creditor: one who links the economic short interest to governance power
purchased on the cheap-a Schadenfreude investor who is also a bully. The
combination of conflicted interest and power is dangerous, especially when
economic positions are not transparent. At that point, the claimant may
become, in effect, a "Trojan Horse." To the extent that the Bankruptcy Code
embodies certain distributional principles, the "Trojan Horse" creditor may
seek to distort them. Worse yet, when such a creditor purchases control on
the cheap and uses it to realize on a short position, it does not just reallocate
the value of the debtor firm, but actually destroys it.
We are not the first to identify this dynamic. Professors Henry T.C. Hu
and Bernard Black, somewhat less colorfully describe a creditor who has
delinked economic interest and governance rights as an "empty creditor."3o
28. While this argument is frequently made by advocates of claims trading, we are not
entirely convinced. It seems to us to simply be an example, and exaltation, of the sunk cost fallacy.
The ability to make an economic exit, however, seems to be an unalloyed good, unless it
undercuts governance.
29. SeeAdamJ. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 BROOK.J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 67, 73, 93 (2oog).
30. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and
Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663, 68o (2oo8) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Debt,
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This Article amplifies and further explores those concerns. We explore the
extent to which the problem in bankruptcy is magnified by claims trading
after insolvency, and consider whether bankruptcy law can be adapted to
realign economic interest and governance rights.
We go further, however, than Hu and Black. Our concerns go beyond
governance alone, and loop back to concerns about distribution. The role
and meaning of "equity" in bankruptcy is complex and contested.3' But, as
one of us has explained elsewhere, the Bankruptcy Code is premised on a
principle of equal distribution of a firm's value based on the relative position
of creditors established on the date of the bankruptcy petition.3 To the extent
that a control premium can be realized by certain stakeholders and not others
who were similarly situated on the petition date, the principle of equality of
distribution is violated. We therefore consider whether "claims purchasers,"
as well as "shorts" should have their claims discounted.33 Finally, we recognize
that the "property rights" of secured creditors can confer practical leverage
that allows them to use control over the debtor's property to distort the
Bankruptcy Code's distributional scheme.34
We conclude that the current tools available under the Bankruptcy Code
are inadequate to the problems posed by credit derivatives and claims trading
more generally. We propose an approach that we call "mark-to-market
governance." This approach has four components:
(i) improved disclosure requirements mandating that certain
claimants reveal the timing of their purchase, the price, and
their true economic position;
(2) proportional designation of hedged creditors' votes that would
cause their voting rights to mirror their actual economic interest
(a process we refer to as "mark-to-interest");
Equity and Hybrid Decoupling]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and
Empty Voting Hl: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 728-29 (2008) [hereinafter Hu
& Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting 11]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge
Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Oumership: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphahle) Ownership, i 3J. CORP. FIN. 343, 348-49 (2007) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Hedge Funds,
Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The
New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphahle) Ownership, 7 9 S. CAL. L. REV. 8 1 1, 81 5 (2006)
[hereinafter Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying].
3. CompareJacoby &Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 4, at 688 ("An 'Equitable Snapshot'
establishes the relative position of creditors as of the petition date. The Snapshot fixes, as of the
petition date, the relative positions of unsecured creditors in relation to one another for purposes
of pari passu distribution. It also establishes the relationship between secured (asset-based) and
unsecured (firm-based) claims by fixing the pool of collateral that is encumbered."), with David
A. Skeel,Jr., The Empty Idea of "Equality of Creditors," 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 714 (2018) (asserting
that the equality principle is easily avoided in practice).
32. Jacoby &Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 4, at 713.
33. Se.e infra Part III.
34. See infra Part IV.
IVOL 104:1857IOWA IAWREVIEW1866
ONE DOLLAR, ONE VOTE
(3) allocation of governance rights to claims purchasers based on
their basis (purchase price) to prevent trading based on control
premia (a process we refer to as "mark-to-basis"); and
(4) limitation of secured creditors' right to credit bid in an asset sale
to the value of a secured creditor's collateral itself (the allowed
secured claim), exclusive of any control premium or bankruptcy
created value (a process we refer to as "mark-to-value").
We acknowledge that this approach is not a panacea, but argue that it is a tool
that should be added to the existing governance toolkit.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II develops the phenomenon of
"empty voting"-the separation of economic interest and voting rights-and
reviews the mechanisms by which it can be accomplished in bankruptcy cases.
Part III explores the dynamics of empty voting within the context of particular
bankruptcy cases and illustrates the problems empty voting can create. Part
IV reviews the existing bankruptcy remedies for empty voting and their
limitations. Part V proposes a solution based on the concept of mark-to-
market governance rights. We offer a practical approach to enforcing the
principle of "one dollar, one vote" and consider possible objections. We
conclude by outlining what is possible within the existing legal framework and
which the statutory adjustments would be required to implement a full mark-
to-market governance system.35
II. EMPTY VOTING AND EMPTY CREDITORS IN BANKRUpTCY
A. EMPTY VOTING
The academic literature on corporate governance has recognized the
negative consequences that can follow when a firm's owner's economic
interest in a firm is separated from that owner's voting rights as a
shareholder.36 This phenomenon has been described as "empty voting."37
Most investors purchase stock based on an economic bet. They hope that the
company-and their ownership interest in it-will increase in value or yield
dividends. Based on this assumption, stockholders are given the power to vote
on corporate directors and on certain major corporate decisions. It is
possible, therefore, to purchase stock in a company and influence the
company's fate. These control rights have economic value, at least if one has
accumulated enough stock to wield influence38 Usually, the control rights are
35. See infra Part VI.
36. See Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 775, 776-78.
37. See Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 30, at 68o; Hu & Black,
Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty VotingII, supra note 3o, at 728-29; Hu & Black, Hedge Funds,
Insiders, and the Decoupling ofEconomic and Voting Ownership, supra note 30, at 348-49; Hu & Black,
The New Vote Buying, supra note 3o, at 815.
38. While creditors are usually characterized as fixed claimants, creditors can influence
corporate governance decisions, even outside of bankruptcy. Corporate debt obligations-notes,
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exercised in disputes about how to increase the value of the firm, but they can
also be exercised in fights over how to allocate that value, or to shift risk
allocations within the firm.
For example, it is possible to hedge one's position, and thereby limit
one's exposure to the company's future financial risks. "Hedging" may serve
legitimate purposes, such as reducing a stockholder's economic exposure to
market fluctuations and facilitating planning. But hedging may also affect
stockholder incentives. A hedged investor, with its downside covered, may
prefer riskier strategies, or engage in suboptimal monitoring.
More troubling, however, is that a stockholder may "insure" more stock
than it owns (because no insurable interest is required to purchase a "short"
position). Such a stockholder will benefit on net if the stock price declines.
Accordingly, the investor will have an economic incentive to exercise their
governance rights to harm the company. As we explain below, these concerns
arise in bankruptcy as well.
B. EMPTY GOVERNANCE IN ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES
Securitizations present a parallel problem. In a securitization, the assets
are managed on a day-to-day basis by an entity called a servicer.39 The servicer
maintains control over the securitized assets (generally loans)-a position
analogous to governance rights in a firm-and thus is in a position to affect
the performance of the securitized assets and hence the value of the asset-
backed security ("ABS").4o The servicer is a presumptively long party to a
securitization because of its reputational risk, because its compensation
depends on the volume of performing assets, and because it is responsible in
some situations for advancing payments on defaulted loans.4, Likewise, the
originator of the assets and the sponsor of the securitization deal have a quasi-
governance role in terms of creating and selecting the assets for the
securitization. The originator and sponsor are presumptively long parties on
the ABS because of their reputational risk and, if the securitized assets do not
conform to representations and warranties, their risk of having to repurchase
the assets.42
The servicer is in a position to take steps to decrease the value of the
securitized assets and hence of the ABS. If the servicer is hedged and a net
short, it might be incentivized to act to decrease the value of the ABS.
bonds, debentures, and loans-contain various covenants that place restrictions on the obligor's
activities, such as mergers, acquisitions, sales, and borrowing, or require maintenance of certain
financial targets. These debt covenants limit managerial autonomy and give certain creditors a
measure of control over corporate governance.
39. See ADAM J. LEVITIN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND MODERN
COMMERCIAL MARKETS 124 (2d ed. 2019).
40. See id.
41. SeeAdamJ. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 24 (201 1).
42. See LEVITIN, supra note 39, at 125-
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Likewise, if the originator or sponsor are in fact net short on the ABS, they
might be incentivized to securitize poorer quality assets in order to boost the
value of their short position.
The problem of empty governance has already been partially addressed
in the context of asset-backed securities. Regulation AB II, the revised
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regulation for offerings of
ABS, requires that the originator, sponsor, and the servicer disclose any hedge
(including by an affiliate) related to the credit risk on the asset-backed
securities.43 This disclosure mandate is backed up by both public enforcement
by the SEC and private rights of action.44 Additionally, the sponsor, depositor,
and issuing entity have to disclose any material business relationships with any
other entity involved in the securitization that is outside of the ordinary course
of business or on non-arm's length terms.45 This means that any attempt at
buying influence of the servicer or trustee or other party involved in the
securitization through transactions at non-arm's length terms would have to
be disclosed.
C. EMPTY CREDITORS
Outside of bankruptcy, or at least absent default, creditors do not
generally have formal governance rights. Indeed, a number of doctrines even
prohibit creditors from exercising control to disadvantage other creditors.4 6
43. 17C.F.R.§§229.1104 (g),22 9 .,lo8(e), 2 29 .lllo(b)( 3 ) (2018).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77 h-1 (2012) (allowing public enforcement by the SEC); id. § 7 7k (allowingprivate enforcement); id. § 771 (allowing private enforcement).
45. 17C.F.R.§22 9 .1 1 1 9 (b).
46. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 3o8 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) (discussing equitable subordination
and equitable disallowance); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 308-09, 324( 939) (discussing recharacterization); Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank of St. Paul (In reAm. Lumber
Co.), 7 B.R. 519, 529 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979) (discussing equitable subordination).
It should be noted that in restructurings involving public debt, empty voting may occur. See
William W. Bratton & AdamJ. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1635-36(2018) (discussing empty voting in out-of-court debt restructurings, which takes on a different
flavor). Empty voting can occur in out-of-court restructurings of corporate debt. Id. Publicly-
issued corporate debt securities ("bonds") are subject to a federal securities law known as the
Trust Indenture Act, which prohibits the impairment of a bondholder's right to payment without
that individual bondholder's consent. 15 U.S.C- § 77PPP(b). This ability to withhold consent
from a restructuring means that individual bondholder can holdout and free ride on the
restructuring benefits; all of the concessions made to achieve the restructuring are borne by the
consenting bondholders. See Bratton & Levitin, supra, at 16o8. The Trust Indenture Act thus
enables individual bondholders to holdout in the face of proposed restructurings of payment
terms, which in turn discourages other bondholders from accepting restructuring proposals
because they must bear the cost of paying the holdouts. Id.
The bond issuer response is to use so-called "exit consents" to coerce bondholder
acceptance of debt exchange offers. Id. at 16o9-io. In an exit consent transaction, an exchange
offer will be paired with a preceding vote to strip out various covenants that indirectly protect the
bondholders' right to payment. Id. The result is to make the unexchanged bonds less valuable,
and thereby encourage acceptance of the exchange offer. Id. Exit consents involve a type of empty
voting, because the exchanging bondholders are voting to strip out covenants-change
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But things change both as a practical matter upon insolvency, and as a formal
matter in bankruptcy.47 Creditors have the power to influence the conduct of
the case in various ways, and acquire key governance rights with regard to
bankruptcy plan confirmation. The junior creditors, who hold the residual
(and hence variable) claim to the firm's value, become, in effect, the "owners'
of an insolvent company, and investors in this so-called "fulcrum" security may
actually gain control of the reorganized firm upon exit from bankruptcy.4
8
The distribution to them under a Chapter i plan may be a controlling
interest in the equity of the reorganized firm.49
Prior to plan confirmation, creditors have voice, both individually and
collectively, through creditors' committees.5o Unsecured creditors can object
to non-ordinary course transactions during the bankruptcy case.s Unsecured
creditors also have the power to vote on the plan (if their claims are impaired)
and insist upon certain minimal distributions of assets.52 Secured creditors too
have the right to vote if impaired.53 They can insist upon a distribution that
matches the value of their encumbered collateral,54 and have a right to
"adequate protection" against depreciation of their collateral.55 Indeed, they
can seek a lifting of the automatic stay-the injunction that comes into place
against collection actions against the debtor upon the filing of the bankruptcy
petition-if adequate protection is not provided.5 6 Finally, lenders that
provide debtor-in-possession financing-new financing for the debtor during
the bankruptcy-often have extraordinary governance rights by contract and
court order, including selection of certain officers of the debtor, the ability to
insist on sales of certain of the debtor's assets, budgets for the debtor's
operations, and timelines for the debtor's reorganizational process.5
7
governance rights-from debt that they will no longer own. Id. The exchanging bondholders are
exercising governance rights that are unattached to their economic interests. Id.
47. As we will discuss below, upon default, the practical power of creditors to exercise their
remedies grants tremendous holdout power to a variety of key players. Bankruptcy limits these
unilateral veto rights, in exchange for formal governance rights.
48. Levitin, supra note 29, at 92-94.
49. Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Claims Trading, 15J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD- 772, 790-91, 79 I
n.32 (2018) (noting that claims trading is prevalent in the "fulcrum" class or classes of claims).
50. See LEVITIN, supra note 39, at 367-68.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 3 6 3 (b) (2012) (governing transactions outside of the ordinary course of
business); id. § 9og (governing the right to be heard).
52. Id. § 1 129(a)(7) (asserting the best interest test for minimum distribution); id.
§ i 129(a) (8), (a) ( i o) (voting); id. § 1 1 2 9 (b) (2) (B) (ii) (codifying the absolute priority test for
distributional fairness).
53. Id.1§ 126.
54. Id. §§ 7 25, 1129(a)(7), 112 9 (b) (2)(A).
55- Id. § 362 (d) (i).
56. Id.
57. LEVITIN, supra note 39, at 409-11; Sris Chatterjee et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 28
J. BANKING & FIN. 3097, 3098-99 (2004) (detailing terms of DIP loans).
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The assumption underlying bankruptcy law is that these powers will be
exercised by stakeholders with mutually aligned interests to maximize their
recovery. Because interests are aligned, this rational behavior will serve to
maximize the value of the firm. If, however, the economic interest of a
creditor diverges from the interest listed in its proof of claim, conflicts of
interest can arise that may impair the ability of the debtor and other
stakeholders to engage in value-maximizing decision-making. As a result, the
"empty voting" problem appears in bankruptcy as an "empty creditor"
problem, at least in theory.58 As noted, Professors Henry Hu and Bernard
Black have published a controversial article describing what they call the
"empty creditor" hypothesis,59 but the problem they identify does not appear
to be merely theoretical. Indeed, the "empty voting" problem appears to be a
driving force in the run-up to many of the most contested bankruptcies of
recent years.60
For example, in the lead up to Caesars Entertainment's bankruptcy,
Caesars alleged that some of its second-lien noteholders were seeking to
thwart an out-of-court restructuring in order to bolster the value of credit
default swaps they held on Caesars.6' Likewise, there was speculation that
prior to the Chrysler bankruptcy some of the secured creditors had hedged
their positions, encouraging them to engage in holdout behavior.6 2 Similar
speculation existed for Tower Automotive's bankruptcy.63
In the Lyondell Chemical bankruptcy, the judge even noted that it had
been reported that "certain holders of credit default swaps have attempted to
aggregate [a sufficient percentage of the debtor's notes] in order to
accelerate them and create a 'termination event' that would entitle them to
58. Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Emply Voting II, supra note 3o, at 731-32; see
also Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem, 24 REV.
FIN. STUD. 2617, 2618 (2011) (arguing that "a creditor with a [credit default swaps] contract
may indeed be more reluctant to restructure the debt of a distressed debtor . . ."); Yesha Yadav,
Empty Creditors and Sovereign Debt: What Now?, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 103, 104 (2014) (stating how"[o] n
the surface, credit protection sellers and protection buyers [of CDS] appear locked in battle").
59. Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II, supra note 30, at 728.6o. See Daniel Hemel, Comment, Empty Creditors and Debt Exchanges, 27 YALEJ. ON REG. 159,
I6o-61 (2010) (noting cases of alleged empty creditor behavior in the run-up to bankruptcy); Is
the 'Empty Creditor' Theory Itself Empty?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 21, 2009, 4:54 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/200 9 /12/21/is-the-empty-creditor-theory-just-empty (detailing
alleged empty creditor situations in international restructurings); see also Henry T.C. Hu, Financial
Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of Decoupling and Transparency,
70 Bus. LAW. 347, 371-72 (2015) (detailing several recent high-profile bankruptcies).
61. Complaint at 22, Caesars Entm't Operating Co. v. Appaloosa Inv. Ltd. P'ship 1, 48 Misc.
3d 1212(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014) (No. 652392/2014).
62. See Mark A. Hofmann, TARP Inspector Asked to Probe CDS Link to Automakers, Bus. INS.(May 6, 2009), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20o
9 o 5 o6/NEWS/ 2 ooo 6128.
63. Frank Partnoy& David A. Skeel,Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1019, 1034-35 (2007).
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payment on the credit default swaps from their swap counterparties."
64 Even
putting aside the alleged bad behavior, the Lyondell Chemical court noted
that
[m]any of the objecting parties [to a stay of collection actions against
non-debtor guarantors] are holders of the 2015 Notes ("2015
Noteholders"), though some are also parties to credit default swaps
that protect such holders from the risk of nonpayment-and whose
interests are materially different from those who simply hold the
2015 Notes. Expressing a concern that is increasingly common in
the large chapter ii cases in this Court, some of the 2015
Noteholders argue that they would be affected much more
dramatically by an inability to recover on the 2015 Notes than a 2015
Noteholder with a credit default swap would.65
Similarly, it was noted that when auto parts manufacturer Delphi filed for
bankruptcy, the price of its securities went up because various derivatives
needed to be physically settled.66 The supply of actual debt securities ($2
billion) was not sufficient to meet the derivative market's demand ($25 billion
of credit default swaps ("CDS") coverage outstanding) when all of the
derivatives had to be settled simultaneously, thereby driving up the securities
prices.67 The same phenomenon appeared with Eastman Kodak, where there
were notional $773 million of CDS outstanding against $i billion of debt
securities, only around $227 million of which appear to reflect hedged "basis
players" who arbitrage between the spreads on the bonds and the spreads on
the CDS. 68 The implication is that roughly $5oo million of the CDS on
Eastman Kodak were naked, unhedged bets on the firm's solvency. Notably,
after the CDS auction settlement for Kodak, bond prices rallied, as another
cadre of investors sought to purchase them for purposes of investing in the
bankruptcy.69
The most direct allegation of a creditor taking actions to harm a debtor
in order to collect on derivative positions comes from the on-going
Windstream bankruptcy. In 2015, Windstream, a rural telecommunications
company, engaged in a sale-leaseback transaction that violated the terms of
some of its bond indentures.7o Aurelius, a distressed debt hedge fund,
64. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Servs. Inc. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.),
402 B.R. 571, 585 n.26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
65. Id. at 577-78 (emphasis omitted).
66. Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Denivatives and the Future of Chapter i i, 8 I AM. BANKR. L.J. 405,
416 (2007).
67. Id.; Melissa Mott, Kodak CDS Auction Sheds Light on Settlement Process, REUTERS (Mar. 2,
2012, 3:1 1 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/markets-credit-idUSL2E8E28EZ2o 20302.
68. Mott, supra note 67.
69. Id.
70. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Windstream Servs., LLC, No. I 7 -CV-7 85 7 (JMF), 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26129, at *3, *66 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019).
IVOL 104:18571872
ONE DOLLAR, ONE VOTE 1873
purchased some of Windstream's bonds and then sought to enforce the
covenant default two years after it had occurred.7' Windstream alleged that
Aurelius held a large CDS short position on its bonds, and that Aurelius's
litigation over a technical default was motivated solely by Aurelius's desire to
trigger a payout on its CDS position.72 Following an unsuccessful attempt to
restructure its debts to gain waiver of the default, Windstream filed for
bankruptcy.73
In addition to CDS allegedly being used by shorts to harm debtors,
debtors have sometimes actually collaborated with both longs and shorts
seeking to manipulate their recovery on a CDS position. Perhaps the most
aggressive manipulation of the CDS and related debt markets observed to date
involves Hovnanian Enterprises, a large homebuilder.74 GSO Capital Partners,
a hedge fund embedded in the Blackstone Group, one of the world's largest
private equity firms, purchased some $330 million in CDS protection on
Hovnanian's debt from Solus Alternative Asset Management LP, another
hedge fund.75 GSO then offered to refinance some of Hovnanian's debt on
substantially below market terms.7 6 The refinancing included the
requirement that Hovnanian issue some new debt to a Hovnanian affiliate
and then default on that debt by making a $1.04 million interest payment to
its affiliate a few days late, at a time when Hovnanian had over $500 million
cash on hand.77 The default was too small to trigger cross-default clauses on
Hovnanian's other obligations, but was just large enough to trigger a credit
event on the CDS.78 Moreover, the new debt issued by Hovnanian to its
affiliate was itself on substantially below market terms, thereby depressing the
market price of the debt.79 Because the payout on the CDS is based on the
pricing of the cheapest-to-deliver debt of the entity referenced in the swap,
71. Id. at *3 , *2 4 .
72. Windstream Holdings, Inc., Windstream Holdings, Inc. Files for Voluntary Reorganization
Under Chapter ii of the US. Bankruptcy Code Following Judge Furman's Decision, WINDSTRFAM
(Feb. 25, 2019), http://news.windstream.com/news-releases/news-release-details/windstream-
holdings-inc-files-voluntary-reorganization-under.
73. Declaration of Tony Thomas, Chief Executive Officer and President of Windstream
Holdings, Inc., (I) in Support of Debtors' Chapter Ii Petitions and First Day Motions and (II)
Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2, In reWindstream Holdings, Inc. at 11 9- 10, 14, No.
19-22312 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2019) (No. 27), http://www.kccllc.net/windstream/
document/1 9 2g2 3 1 9022500000000040.
74. Ilovnanian Enterprises Inc. CIA, BARRON's, https://www.barrons.com/quote/stock/us/
xnys/hov/company-people (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
75. Mary Childs, The Hedge Fund Skirmish that Could Kill the CDS Market, BARRON'S (Jan. 26,
2018, 7:32 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-hedge-fund-batte-that-could-kill-the-
cds-market-1 517013136.
76. Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. LP v. GSO Capital Partners L.P., No. 18 CV 232-LTS-BCM, 2o 18
WL 62049o, at *I (S.D.N.YJan. 29, 2018).





the issuance of the below market debt ensured that the payout to GSO would
be larger.o Lest this be thought a "one-off," GSO had previously engaged in
a similar transaction involving the CDS on the Spanish gaming conglomerate
Codere, SA, a deal that merited mention on The Daily Show.8'
Moreover, GSO was not alone in playing the CDS manipulation game.
Solus-the protection seller to Hovnanian-had itself unsuccessfully offered
Hovnanian below market financing that would have been coupled with "an
unusual provision under which Hovnanian would be in default under Sollu]s'
financing instruments if any failure by Hovnanian to pay any of its debt
obligations constituted a failure to pay Credit Event with respect to CDS
contracts.""8 Apparently, the debtor accepted the better offer. They chose to
trigger the payout on a CDS. Litigation over the Hovnanian transaction
settled,83 but it shows how players with short positions via CDS can engage in
manipulative transactions with the entity whose debt is referenced by the
CDS. 84
So. Id.
8 i. Stephanie Ruble et al., Blackstone Unit Wins in No-Lose Codere Trade: Corporate Finance,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2013, 10:02 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o13-o-
22/blackstone-unit-wins-in-no-lose-codere-trade-corporate-finance; see also The Daily Show withjon
Stewart: Blackstone & Codere, COMEDY CENT. (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.cc.com/video-
clips/og8sum/the-daily-show-with-jon-stewart-blackstone-codere (covering-in a comedic
manner-GSO's nefarious behavior and highlighting the lack of coverage of this transaction by
2 4 -hour financial news networks).
82. Solus Alt. Asset MgmL. LP, 2018 WL 62049o, at *3.
83. Claire Boston & Sridhar Natarajan, Blackstone, Solus Settle Fight Over Hovnanian CDS
Trade, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 201 8, 6:oo PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 8-
05-30/ hovnanian-pays-overdue-intereston-bonds-within-grace-period.
84. Radio Shack's bankruptcy illustrates the flip-side of the Hovnanian situation, 
in which
long, rather than short, creditors engage in the manipulation of the market. Some of 
Radio
Shack's creditors had allegedly sold CDS protection on Radio Shack debt, making them extra
long. See Michael Aneiro, What's Keeping Radio Shack Ajloat? Credit Derivatives, BARRON'S (Dec. 19,
2014), https://www.barrons.com/articles/whats-keeping-radio-shack-afloat-credit-derivatives-
1419003199. When it appeared that Radio Shack would default, these creditors 
extended a new
loan to Radio Shack so that it would only default after the expiration of the credit default swaps. See 
id.
In reaction to situations like Hovnanian and Codere, the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association ("ISDA") announced in March 2019 a proposal to "re-defin[e] failure to
pay" under "credit event" as part of its Master Agreement to exclude failures to pay that 
are not
causally linked with a deterioration of a firm's creditworthiness or financial condition. Benjamin
Bain et al., Wall Street Titans Cut Deal to Clean Up Shady CDS Trades, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2019,
o:oo AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 9 -o3 - 5 /wall-street-titans-said-to-
cut-deal-to-clean-up-shady-cds-trades (internal quotation marks omitted). The proposal,
undertaken in the shadow of a threat of regulation by the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission, would limit the ability of investors to engage in corporate debt transactions 
to
manipulate CDS, but it would leave untouched the ability of investors to exploit combined CDS
and debt positions. See generally INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE 2014 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS RELATING TO NARROWLY TAILORED 
CREDIT
EVENTS (2019), https://www.isda.org/a/nyKME/2019o 3 o6-NTCE-consultation-doc-complete.pdf
(stating the proposed amendments and explaining the reasoning behind them). A CDS holder
who holds bonds or other debt may refuse to cooperate in a restructuring-thereby triggering a
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While most evidence of empty creditor behavior shows up in the
distressed debt market on the threshold of bankruptcy, there are some
indications that it may be continuing in bankruptcy. In broadband
communication company LightSquared's bankruptcy, entities affiliated with
DISH Network, a competitor of the debtor, allegedly purchased the debtor's
secured debt in the bankruptcy claims market in order to block a
reorganization plan pushed by the debtor's controlling shareholder.85
Another DISH-affiliated entity also made a low-ball asset purchase offer in
order to confuse the market regarding the value of the debtor's assets and
thereby chill bidding.8 6 Similarly, in broadband company DBSD's bankruptcy,
DISH Network again attempted to block a plan by purchasing a position in
DBSD's secured debt.87 DISH's supposed goal in this scheme was to force
DBSD into a strategic transaction with DISH by precluding alternative
transactions.88
Likewise, while bankruptcy constitutes a "credit event" for CDS that
entitles the protection buyer to terminate the swap and collect payment, the
payout on the CDS to the protection buyer is not immediate. The payout
amount on the CDS is calculated based on the clearing price in an auction for
the referenced debt conducted by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association ("ISDA"). The ISDA auction date is set by an ISDA
Determinations Committee, 89 but may easily take place a month or more after
the bankruptcy filing, depending on the complexity of the legal issues that
need to be addressed regarding the auction, such as precisely which debt
instruments are eligible for inclusion in the auction. The auction mechanics
are complicated and need not concern us here; the bottom line is that the
higher the auction price of the covered debt obligations, the lower the payout
on the CDS by the protection sellers.
The delay between the bankruptcy filing and the ISDA CDS clearing
auction means that parties invested in CDS have a post-bankruptcy exposure
window. Post-bankruptcy exposure creates an incentive for the swap
counterparties to attempt to affect the fortunes of the debtor firm in order to
affect the market value of the debt insured by the CDS and thereby increase
default and increasing their CDS recovery. In other words, even if the ISDA proposal is adopted,
it will not affect the empty creditor problem, but only what one might term the "empty
counterparty." The situation alleged to exist in Lyondell and Windstream is thus not addressed
by the ISDA proposal.
85. Harbinger Capital Partners LLC v. Ergen (In re LightSquared Inc.), 504 B.R. 321,
332-33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
86. Id. at 3 3 3 .
87. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In reDBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3 d 79, 104(2d Cir. 2010).
88. Id.
89. Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, The Credit Event Process, at slide 1 2 (last visited Mar.
9, 2o19), available at https://www.isda.org/a/cKwEE/TheCreditEventProcess.pdf.
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(in the case of protection buyers) or decrease (in the case of protection
sellers) the payouts on CDS.
Thus, in Sears' bankruptcy, the hedge fund Cyrus Partners LP had sold
CDS protection on Sears debt.9o Cyrus first attempted to prevent Sears from
selling certain pre-existing intercompany obligations into the market because
of a concern that those obligations could be bid into the CDS clearing auction
and by virtue of expanding the pool of debt, lower the auction price and
therefore increase the payout on the CDS.9' Having failed to prevent the sale
of the intercompany obligations, Cyrus then bought the notes itself,92 even as
it lobbied ISDA to make the intercompany obligations ineligible for the
auction. And finally, Cyrus made a second-lien DIP loan to Sears, which
increased the likelihood of Sears' survival and thus the value of its bonds,
which reduced the payout on the CDS.93 Cyrus is a case of a party pursuing
governance strategies based on being extraneously long on the debtor, but it's
notable that Cyrus was opposed in its efforts by CDS protection buyers, who
were short on Sears. Both longs and shorts in the CDS market have an interest
in affecting corporate governance in bankruptcy because of the delay between
bankruptcy and the determination of the payouts on the CDS.
Although Hu and Black recognize that there may be an empty voting
problem in bankruptcy, they do not identify the extent to which it goes to the
very heart of the bankruptcy system. As a response, Hu and Black principally
propose an enhanced disclosure regime. They passingly acknowledge that
disclosure may be insufficient, and that adjustment of voting rights may be
necessary.94 But the problem runs deeper than they recognize-going to the
very heart of the Code's distributional scheme. Accordingly, they do not seek
to operationalize this suggestion, nor do they explore when and why
disclosure may be insufficient.95 Hu and Black work from a straight analogy
to the "empty voting" problem with regard to equity investments in a solvent
90. Jessica DiNapoli, Sears Investors Claim Hedge Fund Cyrus Improperly Influencing Credit




92. Andrew Scurria, Sears's $82.5 Million Note Sale to Cyrus Is Throwm into Doubt, WALL ST.J.
(Dec. 20, 2018, 7:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/searss-82-5-million-note-sale-to-cyrus-is-
thrown-into-doubt-i 1545351623.
93. Lillian Rizzo, Sears Finds New Bankruptcy Loan Lender in Swap Seller, WALL ST.J. (Nov. 27,
2018, 7:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sears-finds-new-bankruptcy-loan-lender-in-swap-
seller-i543365721.
94. See Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 30, at 684-85.
95. Id. (suggesting that given the problems of conflicted plan voting, the use of asset sales
without voting to effectuate reorganization might be preferable, but noting the problem of credit
bidding by empty creditors); Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II, supra note
3o, at 731-32.
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company.9 6 Because of this, they do not recognize ways in which insolvency
changes the landscape both as a strategic matter-altering the practical and
legal power held by a Trojan Horse creditor-and as a policy matter
-implicating the bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution of firm value
(discussed in the next subpart).
Schadenfreude creditors, bullies, and Trojan Horse creditors in bankruptcy
raise additional concerns that may require more aggressive intervention than
Hu and Black recognize. First, claims trading in distress situations implicates
more than ownership. The future of the firm and its very viability are at stake.
Second, control rights may be purchased at a discount. Third, the Bankruptcy
Code, by design, gives more voice to various creditor constituencies, making
it even easier to obtain a blocking position. And fourth, to the extent that this
leverage changes hands after insolvency, it creates opportunities to distort the
Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. In this Article, we seek to identify the full
breadth of situations where such governance distortions occur (including
with regard to secured creditors) and suggest a practical approach to
remedying their effects.
D. EMPTY CREDITORS, EcoNOMICEXITANDEQUALITY OFDISTRIBUTION
As the preceding section shows, the empty creditor problem can arise
both as a result of trading in claims of the debtor, and through the purchase
of related assets.97 The key point developed above is that control rights have
economic value that is separate and distinct from the economic interest
underlying the claim, and that they can be used in ways that harm the debtor
or other claimants. This is a governance problem because it can create
conflicts of interest (loyalty), that distorts the way governance rights (voice)
are used. It also complicates the problem of exit. It creates a distinction
between creditors who make an economic exit by selling their claim, from
those who sell at a premium because they exit by selling into a control block.
This exit distinction has governance implications, because an ordinary
creditor who sells to a Trojan Horse creditor not only receives a premium on
the value of their claim, the governance rights associated with that claim may
be used to harm the remaining incumbent shareholders, either to reduce the
value of the debtor or reallocate value. This raises separate and distinct
concerns about the bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution and its
interaction with governance rights.
There are many benefits to allowing creditors to assign their claims after
bankruptcy-to make an economic exit. They may not be well equipped to
participate in a bankruptcy case.98 They might prefer to recognize their losses,
96. Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybiid Decoupling, supra note 30, at 684-85; Hu & Black,
Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voling II, supra note 3o, at 731-32.
97. See supra Section II.C.
98. See Levitin, sutpra note 29, at 93.
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etc.99 Also, a market for claims, at least to the extent it is transparent, provides
information about the value of the firm, because it indicates the market's
valuation of different claims on the capital structure of the firm; to the extent
that the market places a low value on a claim, it is an indication that the
market believes that the firm is worth less than the aggregate amount of all
senior claims. Critically, claims trading does not distort the relative position
of claims.
However, where governance rights are part of the proposed trade, this is
not the case. To understand this point requires a brief discussion of a deeper
point about the Bankruptcy Code, and Chapter 1 1 in particular. In Tracing
Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter ii, Edward Janger and Melissa
Jacoby explain the concept of equality of distribution in bankruptcy.o
00
Chapter i1 allows a debtor to delay realization of the value of the firm,
and therefore of claims, beyond the filing date.-o To do this the Code must
establish a way of allocating changes in the value of the firm over time, which
it does by separating the process of realization into two moments, through a
process that we call, "Equitable Realization." Those two moments of
realization are: (1) the filing of the bankruptcy petition; and (2) plan
confirmation or collateral realization.
At the moment of the bankruptcy filing, Equitable Realization occurs,
and the relative positions of creditors are fixed. Unsecured creditors' claims
are fixed relative to each other, o and the pool of encumbered assets is fixed
as well.03 The economic value of their claim, by contrast, is not determined
until the moment of "Value Realization," either the effective date of the plan,
when a distribution is received, or when collateral is disposed of.o
Control rights, to the extent that they inhere in a particular class of
claims, are not an asset of a particular creditor but of the class itself. Also, to
the extent that there is a control premium associated with a block of shares,
that value is not available to the class as a whole, only to those creditors who
sell into the control block. Thus, the distortions created by the Empty
Creditor problem implicate both the bankruptcy policies of value
maximization and equality of distribution, as they alter the relative
distributions of value to creditors within the same class.
E. MECHANISMS FOR SEPARATING EcoNoMIC INTEREST FROM GOvERNANCE RJGHTS
Debt-based governance rights can be separated from economic interests
in more ways than one might think. In this section we discuss the way
99. See id.
100. SeeJacoby &Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 4, at 688-93.
101. See id. at 684-88.
102. 11 U.S.C.§502 (2012).
103. Id. § 552.
104. Id. §§ 5 5 2(b), 1129 (b)(2)(A).
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derivatives can be used to construct such a mismatch, and then go further.
Derivatives are not the only way to create such a mismatch.o5 Some such
conflicts are more deeply imbedded and harder to address, as discussed in
Section IV.C.
1. Put Options
The most straightforward way to bet against a debtor would be to
purchase a put option on the debt. o6 Put options enable a creditor to sell its
debt holdings at a fixed strike price. The put option caps the creditor's
downside exposure to the debtor at the strike price, and because the value of
the put option rises as the debt's market value falls, the creditor may be
incentivized to exercise its governance rights to increase the value of the put
option, especially if the put option is for a greater amount than its current
debt holdings. Thus, a creditor might have a put option for $io million at
par, but only hold $3 million in debt. The creditor might use the governance
105. Two other methods of separating economic interest from governance rights arepurchasing debt at a discount from face and securitizations and participations. Purchasing debt
at a discount from face, whether through secondary market purchase or original issue discount
means that the governance rights on the debt-including voting rights in bankruptcy-track theface amount of the debt, but the economic interest is based on the purchase price as well as theface amount. The purchase price represents the maximum downside exposure for the investor,
even as the face amount represents the maximum upside. Thus, two creditors holding debts foridentical face amounts, but one having purchased the debt at a steep discount, have different
incentives in exercising the governance rights associated with that debt.
Likewise, securitization inherently involves a separation of governance rights over
securitized assets and economic interest in the assets. See Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and HybridDecoupling, supra note 3o, at 665, 691. The securitization investors maintain the economic interestin the assets, but the assets are managed by a servicer and legal title to the assets is held by either
a trustee or a corporate entity. See id. at 665. As a result, securitization investors do not get to vote
on bankruptcy plans and even standing to appear in bankruptcy court to raise objections. See In
re Innkeepers USA Tr., 448 B.R. 131, 142-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 201 s) (finding commercial
mortgage securitization investors lack standing to object to sale bidding procedures, only the
special servicer does); In re Shilo Inn, 285 B.R. 726, 729 (Bankr. D. Or. 2002) (finding
commercial mortgage securitization investors do not individually have the right to vote on aChapter ii plan, only the special servicer does). Loan participations operate much the same in
terms of the separation of governance and economic rights-the original lender maintains legal
title and servicing rights on the loan, while the participants have only. economic rights. SeeLEVITIN, supra note 39, at 81; see also Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics,
Inc.), 269 F.3 d 726, 736-37 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining operation of loan participations).
i o6. See, e.g., Arturo Bris et al., Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the World,
62J. FIN. 1029, 1070-72 (2007) (explaining how put options function as a mechanism for taking
a short position); Bartley R. Danielsen & Sorin M. Sorescu, Why Do Option Introductions Depress
Stock Prices? A Study of Diminishing Short Sale Constraints, 36J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 45 ,
454-58 (2001) (explaining the same); Bruce D. Grundy et al., Do Option Markets Undo Restrictions
on. Short Sales? Evidence from the 2oo8 Short-Sale Ban, io6J. FIN. EcoN. 331, 332, 34-41 (2012)(explaining the same); see also Olagues v. Icahn, 866 F.3 d 70, 72 n. i (2d Cir. 2017) ("The buyer




rights on that $3 million to push down the value of the debt and then go and
purchase another $7 million of debt (now trading at a discount).
2. Credit Default Swaps
Credit derivatives can have a similar effect. For example, a CDS between
a protection buyer and a protection seller pays the protection buyer when a
debtor files for bankruptcy. An investor can go short via CDS protection either
as a protection buyer without an actual holding of the referenced debt
instrument (a "naked short"), or as a protection buyer that holds the
referenced debt instrument (a "clothed protection buyer"), but is more than
fully-hedged via CDS (a "clothed short"). CDS protection may affect the
willingness of a clothed protection buyer to negotiate a workout prior to
bankruptcy, either by making it easier to favor a risky strategy, or, if short, to
actually seek to trigger the default.
CDS can obviously complicate out-of-court debt restructurings. They can
also affect creditor behavior in the run-up to the bankruptcy.
0 7 As a
governance matter this is problematic, because creditors' pre-bankruptcy
behavior may reduce the value of the firm and foreclose potential
restructurings in bankruptcy. Any remedy in bankruptcy would, of course,
have to be imposed ex post.
Critically, however, CDS can also affect creditor behavior at the
beginning of bankruptcies. Under the standardized International Swaps and
Derivatives Association documentation, a CDS will be triggered by the
bankruptcy filing itself.os Since 2oog CDS are, by default, settled through
cash-payment at an auction-determined rate, although a physical settlement
option remains.,o9
As noted above, the auction to determine the settlement price does not
occur immediately upon the bankruptcy filing, but at some point thereafter.
The timing of the auction is left to the discretion of an ISDA Determinations
Committee, but the more complicated the legal questions involved
-particularly issues about what debt obligations are eligible to be bid in the
107. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, Antibankrupicy, i 1g YALE L.J. 648, 683 
(20 10)
("Credit default swaps create a moral hazard problem only before the Chapter i begins and in
its immediate aftermath.").
io8. See, e.g., Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Inc., 2002 ISDA Master Agreement
between Bank of Am., N.A. & LKQ Corp. § 5 (a)(vii)(4)(A) (March 22, 2011), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/io
6 56 9 6 /000119312511 t I80 5 o/dexsos.htm; seealsolNT'L
SWAPs & DERIvATIVES Ass'N, INC., USER's GUIDE TO THE ISDA 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT 14
(2003), https://www.isda.org/a/IAEDE/UG-tO-2002-ISDA-Master-Agreement.pdf ("Section
5(a) (vii) applies to each party, any Credit Support Provider of a party and any 
applicable
Specified Entity of a party. It is drafted so as to be triggered by a variety of events associated 
with
bankruptcy or insolvency .... ).
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auction-the greater the delay. For example, Sears filed for bankruptcy on
October 15, 2018, but the CDS auction did not take place until January 17,
2019.o During the window between the bankruptcy filing and auction to
determine the CDS settlement price, both protection sellers and protection
buyers are incentivized to take actions to affect the settlement price in their
favor, and this means taking actions to attempt to further or hinder the
debtor's reorganization prospects.
The window between the bankruptcy filing and the CDS auction is likely
to be fairly limited in most cases, however, perhaps a month or so. Once the
CDS settlement price is set, the incentive for CDS counterparties to affect the
debtor firm's prospects disappear. In most situations this means that
bankruptcy voting will be unaffected. Unless there is a pre-packaged or pre-
negotiated bankruptcy in which voting takes place before or shortly after the
filing of the petition, any vote on a plan will likely be after the CDS settlement
price is fixed."'1
3. Total Return Swaps
There are other derivative devices that continue to operate, even once a
debtor has filed for bankruptcy. For example, a total return swap ("TRS") is a
swap in which one party to the swap commits to swapping a sum certain for
the total return of the counterparty on a specified reference asset.11 2 Because
TRS are triggered by the occurrence of a date certain, rather than by a credit
event such as a bankruptcy filing, a TRS can continue to be in place after a
bankruptcy filing, or could even be purchased after a bankruptcy filing.' '3
Thus, if our creditor holds a $io million note and purchases a $12 million
TRS, triggered in three years, that creditor would continue to be net short
throughout the term of the swap, regardless of when, or if, the debtor filed
for bankruptcy.
TRS are a limited subset of credit derivatives' '4 and have not been
specifically linked with bankruptcy empty-creditor problems. But there are
myriad ways for the holder of a claim in bankruptcy to use derivatives to hedge
risk, or take a short position. Simply buying a put option after the bankruptcy
io. See Sears Roebuck Accep Corp CDS Credit Event Auction, CREDITEX (Jan. 17, 2019),
http://www.creditfixings.com/CreditEventAuctions/holdingsjsp?auctionld=g 29 (showing
that the Sears CDS clearing auction was held on January 17 of 2019).
1 i l. In cases where the bankruptcy is prearranged, or a restructuring support agreement is
negotiated, CDS may affect dynamics as well.
112. JOHN D. FINNERTY, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
CREDIT DERIVATIVES PRIMER 6, https://www.pwc.com.tr/en/assets/about/svcs/abas/frm/
creditrisk/surveys/pwc-credderi.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2o19).
113. The duration of TRS can itself affect parties' incentives in a bankruptcy, but that is a
secondary issue.
114. We have been unable to identify reliable information on the size of the TRS market.
Statistics on the credit derivatives market do not break out TRS separately from CDS.
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on the claim will do.' 's If the claim's value falls beneath the strike price, the
option holder will exercise the option and sell the claim. The claimholder is
thus hedged for any decline below the strike price.
4. Investment in Competitors
The same is true, derivatives aside, if a creditor has an interest in a
competitor of the debtor. The value of the interest in the competitor might
increase if the debtor is unable to reorganize and liquidates."
6 One such
example occurred in Dish Network v. DBSD, where a competitor of the debtor
bought up claims against the debtor and sought to use them to vote against
the plan of reorganization., '7 In that case, the court "designated" those
creditors' claims and denied them their voting rights."
8 A similar situation
was alleged to have occurred in LightSquared (with the same defendant)."9
5. Investment Across the Capital Structure
Creditors also frequently invest across the capital structure of the
debtor.,2o For example, a first lien secured creditor might also hold an
unsecured position, a second lien position, an equity position, or any of the
above. One might assume that such a creditor would want to maximize the
value of each of its various investments. However, this may not always be the
case. It is possible that the investment in one part of the capital structure may
be for the purposes of obtaining a return, while the investments in the other
parts of the capital structure may be for the purpose of obtaining control, to
be used to increase the return to the creditor's other position(s) in the capital
structure.
Such a creditor's interest and behavior may vary depending on where the
value of the firm lies. If all of the value of a firm can be transferred to the
senior secured creditor through control of ajunior class, the secured creditor
may not have to share with junior creditors. Indeed, it is not unusual for a
secured creditor to privilege its secured claim above its interest as an
unsecured creditor and use its deficiency claim in a way that may actually
harm the other unsecured claimants. 2 Similarly, landlords (who are not
secured creditors, but share an ability to recover specific property) may prefer
115. This is distinct from purchasing a put option prepetition on the debt itself.
i16. See, e.g., Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F. 3 d
79, 1o6-o8 (2d Cir. 201o); Tex. Hotel Sec. Corp. v. Waco Dev. Co., 87 F.2d 395, 400-01 (5 th
Cir. 1936).
117. Dish Network Corp., 634 F.3 d at 87, 1o6-o8.
18. Id. at 1o4-o8.
i ig. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
120. See Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 3o, at 683-84.
12 1. See generally Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Loop 76, LLC (In reLoop 76, LLC), 465 B.R. 525
(B.A.P. 9 th Cir. 2012) (considering when it is appropriate to separately classify a secured
creditor's deficiency claim).
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to recover the leased premises from the debtor in order to relet the property
at a higher market price than to ensure the debtor's continued viability, which
would improve the possibility of a recovery on their unsecured breach of lease
claims, but might continue to lock them in to a below-market lease.
6. Investment in Multiple Affiliates
A similar problem arises in cases involving multiple related debtor
entities. 2 2 A creditor might have an interest in more than one affiliated
debtor firm. In such a case, the creditor might be willing to sacrifice a return
on its investment in one entity in order to achieve a greater recovery for its
investment in another entity under ajoint Chapter i 1 plan. Given that not all
creditors in either entity will be similarly invested, there is an inherent
misalignment of interests. 23
F PROBLEMS CREATED BY SEPARATING EcoNOMIc INTEREST FROM
GOVERNANCE RIGHTS
Thus, there are numerous ways in which a creditor can go short in
bankruptcy and take a Schadenfreude position. Since creditors exercise formal
governance rights in bankruptcy and have informal power when the debtor is
in distress, they can throw their weight around-like a bully. When a conflict
of interest is linked to governance power, the creditor has a strategic incentive
to use that power, not just to take from others, but to reduce the value of the
firm.24
As we will discuss below, this linkage is particularly troubling in
bankruptcy because of: (i) fragmentation; and (2) transparency. With regard
to fragmentation, blocking positions proliferate in bankruptcy (at least as
122. Most large firms structure themselves as a pyramid of holding companies and
subsidiaries. While tort and trade creditors are typically creditors of only one legal entity with
such structures, there will often be a tax liability-sharing agreement among the entities within the
firm, and financial creditors typically receive cross-guaranties from most domestic entities within
the firm structure. In some situations, there will be multiple debtor entities with the same
creditors, but these creditor entities may not have equal interests in all of the debtors.
123. This situation existed in telecommunications company Adelphia's bankruptcy. There
were 230 affiliated debtor entities with some overlapping creditors. ACC Bondholder Grp. v.
Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. (In re Adelphia Comm'cns Corp.), 36 1 B.R. 337, 341-42 (S.D.N.Y.
2007). Five groups of creditors were deputized to litigate various intercompany claims, fraudulent
transfer actions, and other inter-debtor causes of action. Id. at 343-45. Four of the creditor
groups negotiated a settlement at the expense of the other creditor group (the "ACC Bondholder
Group"), which objected to the settlement. Id. The ACC Bondholder Group was not unified,
however-some of its members purportedly had claims against other debtor entities and so were
in favor of the settlement because on net they did better. See id. at 364-67. But see In reAdelphia
Comm'cns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 222 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
I 24. See Ion Media Networks, Inc. v. Cyrus Select Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd. (In re Ion
Media Networks, Inc.), 419 B.R. 585, 588-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that a distressed
debt investor's "motivations are easy enough to recognize. It has been using aggressive
bankruptcy litigation tactics as a means to gain negotiating leverage or obtainjudicial rulings that
will enable it to earn outsize returns on its bargain basement debt purchases . . . .").
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compared to solvent firms), and, because debt is often trading at a
considerable discount, these blocking positions can be purchased on the
cheap. With regard to transparency, the existing regime for disclosing
creditor's potential control positions is rudimentary at best. As a result, when
a control position is combined with an undisclosed short, the creditor
becomes a Trojan Horse creditor.125
1. Current Mechanisms
Concern about use of leverage to reallocate value is not new, and we will
discuss the Code's response in more detail below. Disputes have arisen about
whether secured creditors' deficiency claims can be classified together with
other unsecured creditors 2 6 and whether an (under)secured creditor can sit
on an unsecured creditors' committee.127 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code
already recognizes the problem and provides for it in two contexts.
First, the Code regulates the retention of professionals by the bankruptcy
estate. Professionals, such as attorneys, who assist in the governance of the
debtor during the bankruptcy, can be retained only if they are "disinterested"
and "do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate."'=
5 Thus, to
the extent that a professional is itself a creditor or equity holder, the retention
is prohibited, 29 and if a professional had a material financial position in a
competitor of the debtors, that would also preclude retention. Likewise, if the
professional had previously served as an officer or director of the debtor,
retention is forbiddenl3o-the estate might well have claims against the
professional on account of that prior service, and the professional would be
conflicted in counseling the estate about prosecution of such a claim. The
disinterestedness requirement for professionals is designed to ensure that
those parties who assist in the governance of the estate are not exercising their
influence for their personal benefit at the expense of the estate.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
126. See, e.g., In re Marlow Manor Downtown, LLC, 499 B.R. 717, 720-21 (Bankr. D. Alaska
20 3), aff'd, Marlow Manor Downtown, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Marlow Manor Downtown,
LLC), No. AK-1 4 -1122-JuKiKu, 2015 WL 667543, at *g-io (B.A.P. 9 th Cir. Feb. 6, 2015)
(holding separate classification of unsecured deficiency claim improper); see also Boston Post Rd.
Ltd. P'ship v. FDIC (In re Boston Post Rd. Ltd. P'ship), 2 1 F.3 d 477, 483 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
separate classification of unsecured deficiency claim from unsecured trade claims improper);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Props., XVIII), 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4 th
Cir. 1992); Phoenix Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint
Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1280-81 (5 th Cir. 1991); In re 18 RVC, LLC, 485 B.R. 492,497 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2012); In re SM 104 Ltd., 16o B.R. 202, 220 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); In reBjolmes Realty
Tr., 134 B.R. 1 ooo, 1003 (Bankr. D. Mass. 199 1); In reAztec Co., 107 B.R. 585> 587 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1989).
127. See, e.g., In reWalat Farms, Inc., 64 B.R. 65, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Glendale
Woods Apartments, Ltd., 25 B.R- 414,415 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982).
128. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14), 327(a) (2012).
129. Id.§ 101( 4 )(A).
130. Id. § 1o1(14) (B).
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Second, concerns about conflicted creditors are reflected in the context
of the Code's overlooked "Lesser Vote"-the vote for the election of a Chapter
7 trustee. 3' The only moment when creditors exert governance influence in
Chapter 7 is when they vote to elect the Chapter 7 trustee. The Bankruptcy
Code provides that a creditor may vote for a candidate for trustee only if the
creditor "does not have an interest materially adverse, other than an equity
interest that is not substantial in relation to such creditor's interest as a
creditor, to the interest of creditors entitled to such distribution" and "is not
an insider."132 No such provision exists in Chapter ii, where there is not
normally a trustee appointed and where equity holders and insiders are not
automatically disqualified from all voting.'33
The advent of robust trading in claims and the increased sophistication
of credit derivatives warrants a reexamination of the assumption that there
are sufficient mechanisms available under current law to police conflicts of
interest and to insure equitable distribution of a firm's value. That
assumption, for the reasons we discuss above, is untenable in the face of
modern capital markets.'34 It is now necessary to consider how bankruptcy law
might ensure the alignment of a creditor's economic rights and control rights
in the present environment.
2. Fragmentation Concerns
First, we should elaborate on the fragmentation and transparency
problems created by the separation of economic interest from governance
rights (or to put it the other way around, by the linking of a conflict of interest
to governance rights). As Michael Heller has pointed out, fragmentation
problems arise when the proliferation of veto rights makes it impossible for
common owners to cooperate towards a mutually beneficial outcome.'35 An
economic "short" may seek to sabotage a workout and encourage a
bankruptcy to trigger payment on a derivative that is contingent on a
131. Id. § 702.
132. Id. § 702 (a) (2)-(3).
133. Chapter 11 disqualifies insiders from one of its two votes. While insiders' votes count
for purposes of iI 129(a) (8), they do not count for § 1129(a) (1o).
134. See supra Sections II.E. 2-3.
135. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries ofPrivate Property, I08 YALE L.J. i 163, 1t86-87 (1999);Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
III HARV. L. REv. 621, 68o (1998) [hereinafter Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons].
Fragmentation also interacts with transparency. Compare Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Princip, 1 10 YALE L.J. 1, 3-7(2000) (arguing that because property rights affect the rights of third parties, transparency is
essential, and therefore, complex and divided forms of property should be discouraged), with
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus
Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S373, S374-75 (2002) (asserting that the
problem of division and transparency can be remedied through verification systems).
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bankruptcy filing or other default.'3 6 Similarly, a claimant with a short
position may seek to block confirmation of a bankruptcy plan in order to force
liquidation, or may be willing to bargain aggressively in ways that may disrupt
the administration of the case due to its hedged or inverted economic
interest.s7 The "short" thus benefits from the misfortune of the debtor.
When governance rights in bankruptcy trade at a discount, it becomes
cheaper for a short to become a Trojan Horse and bring about the misfortune
it desires. As such, the ability to separate economic interest from governance
rights can create or exacerbate coordination problems at both the workout
stage and at the plan confirmation stage.'3
8 Too much liquidity can, thus,
create tragedies of both the "commons" and the "anticommons."139 Where
the right to use an asset is held in common, claimants trying to grab too large
a share can lead to destruction of an existing asset. This is a tragedy of the
"commons." Where creation or preservation of a common asset-in this case
a firm's reorganization or going concern value-is subject to multiple or fluid
"veto rights," such as claimants drifting in and out of blocking positions, the
result can be to frustrate the coordination necessary to create a common
benefit. This is the tragedy of the "anticommons." As we will discuss below,
this is particularly problematic in bankruptcy, where, by design, the Code
gives a variety of claimants legal and practical veto rights over the
reorganization-considerably more than exist when a company is solvent,
though also somewhat less than that claimant might have outside of
bankruptcy against an insolvent firm.140
Coordination problems can emerge naturally as a product of the liquidity
of claims. For example, a debtor may work out a deal with one key creditor,
136. See Complaint, supra note 61, ¶ 3.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65. In theory there is also a mirror 
image problem
of the excessively "long" investor. In its most basic form, this is the problem of vendors and
employees. Their interest in the debtor is not limited to the amount of their prepetition claim,
but is likely driven by their hope of getting future business from the debtor.
The excessive long problem extends to investors, however. For example, an investor might
own both the equity of the debtor and the equity of a key supplier of the debtor's. Such an
investor might be happy for the debtor to assume excessive risk in order to keep the debtor
providing business to its other investment. Conversely, if the debtor is a key supplier of a firm in
which the investor is also invested, the investor might want to keep the debtor operating in order
to ensure a supply to the other firm. We do not address this issue here because the governance
problems that have presented themselves in bankruptcy have all been from short positions, not
excessive long positions.
138. Janger, supra note 24, at 53-56 (discussing coordination issues at the plan confirmation
stage). See generally Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 107 (discussing coordination problems in
Chapter st bankruptcy).
139. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sd. 1243 (1968)
(describing the tragedy of the commons); Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 135
(describing the tragedy of the anticommons).
140. The Bankruptcy Code is designed to facilitate collective governance by limiting 
the
rights of holdouts. However, as we will discuss below, even in bankruptcy, "holdout" creditors
have considerably more leverage than "dissenting" shareholders.
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only to have that creditor sell its claim to a new party. Where the purchaser of
the claim is a Schadenfreude investor-an economic short-the purchaser's
goal may be to obstruct any agreement. The debtor and other creditors have
no way of knowing this or of remedying the informational problem prior to
bankruptcy and, under current law, even in bankruptcy. i Alternatively, the
claims may find themselves in the hands of a holdout, willing to destroy the
debtor to leverage a larger share of the pie. Worse yet, false signaling and
coordination problems may interact and reinforce each other. For example,
while the liquidity of claims is generally thought to improve the amount of
information in the case, by setting a value for the debt,i2 it may be being used
to accumulate a control position on behalf of a short.
3. Transparency Concerns
A second broad concern is false signaling (i.e., transparency). Concealed
or disguised short positions impose informational costs on other investors. To
participate in a bankruptcy, stakeholders are only required to disclose their
"claim" or "interest," not what they paid for it, and not whether they have
engaged in any hedging behavior. Therefore, it is difficult for other claimants
to evaluate whether, for example, an unsecured creditor's behavior is driven
by their interest in maximizing their economic interest as an unsecured
creditor, or for some other reason.
This false signaling is particularly troublesome in bankruptcy cases.
Bankruptcy law recognizes that it may not be rational for an individual
unsecured creditor to put much effort into monitoring a case. The gains from
monitoring or otherwise participating will be shared pro rata with all
unsecured creditors, but the costs of monitoring are borne by the individual
monitoring creditor. The hope in bankruptcy law is that the smaller creditors
will free ride on the information provided by the behavior of larger creditors.
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code provides for an official committee or committees
of unsecured creditors funded by the bankruptcy estate.13 The idea is that
the larger, more sophisticated creditors will serve on these committees and
that the smaller creditors will piggyback on their efforts. The committee
members are made whole, because the direct pecuniary costs of committee
service are paid by the estate.14s Because official committee members serve in
141. Creditors will sometimes use both pre- and post-petition restructuring support
agreements (also known as lock-up agreements) to attempt to bind themselves and others to
supporting plans that meet particular characteristics, see Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin,
Badges of Opportunism: Princip esfor Policing Resuturing Support Ageemnts, 13 BROOK.J. CORP. FIN.
& COMM. L. (forthcoming 2019), but these devices do not ensure that parties to the agreements
are in fact long or that they do not subsequently acquire short positions.
142. Douglas G. Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 23,
26-27 (2009).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2012).
144. Seeid.§H 3 3 0, 1103.
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a representative capacity, however, they are subject to fiduciary duties that
limit their right to engage in self-interested behavior.45 Fiduciary duties,
however, are an imperfect protection against false signaling because they are
less than crystalline and are imperfectly enforced. 46 Moreover, not all
signaling is done by committee members. Small creditors may choose simply
to follow the lead of creditors with larger positions that are not committee
members (perhaps because they do not wish to be subject to trading
restrictions).
In short, the purchase of a control position or a combination of control
and blocking positions creates the power to obstruct, which may be reinforced
by the lack of transparency. Also of significance, these "control" positions may
have financial value that is separate and distinct from the distributional rights
they represent. If control rights can be traded separately from economic
rights, the ability of certain claimants to realize value on the control premium
raises serious concerns about the "equitable distribution of [a] firm['s]
value."'.7
G. DISTRESSED DEBT TRADING AND GOVERNANCE
It is now commonly understood, even by non-specialists, that debt of
insolvent and bankrupt firms continues to trade, even after the debtor has
filed for bankruptcy. This is not an unusual feature of bankruptcy regimes,
but the governance effects (as distinct from the distributional effects) are
more dramatic in the United States, where there is generally no formal
fiduciary or administrator charged with administering the debtor, and the
estate is overseen by a debtor-in-possession.4 5 There is a significant market
for "distressed debt."149 Some of the investors in this market (sometimes
derided as "vulture funds") are merely making a prediction about the likely
return on the firm's debts.'5o Others, however, may be investing in a
"governance play."'s' As we have discussed above, debt traders are not
145. Committee members are also subject to trading bars because they are privy to substantial
non-public information about the debtor. Robert P. Enayati, Note, Undermining the Trading Wall:
The BAPCPA's Affront on the Creditors' Committee's Duty of Confidentiality in Chapter iz Bankruptcies,
21 GEO.J.LEGALETHICS 703, 7o6 (2008).
146. John A. E. Pottow, Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy and Insolvency, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAw (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., forthcoming Apr. 2019). See also
generally Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (2007) (proposing an alternative doctrine in which a corporation in
bankruptcy would not owe a higher duty to creditors than shareholders).
147. SeeJacoby &Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 4, at 679.
148. See LEVITIN, supra note 39, at 358-59 (noting that "[i]n Chapter it, the default mode
is for existing management to remain in place and to operate the debtor as a 'debtor-in-
possession' (DIP)" and that "[imn many countries outside the United states, a trustee is the default
setting for all insolvencies").
149. See Levitin, supra note 29, at 76-77.
150. Id. at 8g, 95-
151. See id. at 95.
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necessarily investing purely in economic return. They might be seeking to
purchase the company (sometimes called a "loan-to-own" investor); for
insolvent firms, debt markets are part of the market for corporate control.
It is also common for the price of a company's stock to change, and with
it, the price of purchasing control over a firm. Corporate raiders look for
bargains. When a stock's price falls, it may make a firm a takeover target
because the control rights can be purchased at a relatively cheaper price. As
we have shown, however, the motives may not be so benign. The investor
might be the owner of a competitor, or might in some other way be an
economic short. 52
These aspects of the market for corporate control do not distinguish
distressed debt markets from equity markets (though the fact that debt is in
bankruptcy shifts the locus of regulation from securities regulation and state
corporate law to federal bankruptcy law). Control rights trade at a premium,
and all of these phenomena (including empty voting) exist in equity markets
and are relatively unregulated.53
In this section, we challenge the understanding that trading of
governance rights after insolvency, and particularly after filing for
bankruptcy, requires no more regulation than trading in equities outside of
bankruptcy. In our view, there are additional dynamics and policies that come
into play on the event horizon where fixed claims without governance rights(debt) turn, effectively, into variable claims with governance rights (stock).
The practicalities of this transformation are not well understood, and its
implications are not adequately theorized. In this section, we sketch out some
important differences. First, the fact that debt trades at a discount may create
bargain price control blocks, but more importantly, bankruptcy-specific
aspects of the plan confirmation process multiply the number of such
"bargain blocking positions," and mandate different legal treatment of
governance rights in bankruptcy.
1. The Event-Horizon-Insolvency
A key difference between the governance of a firm in bankruptcy and
governance of a solvent company is that bankruptcy governance straddles an
indistinct but nonetheless crucial event horizon-insolvency. When a debtor
enters the zone of insolvency, debt begins to act like stock. Fixed claimants
become variable claimants, and the former owners of a firm are potentially
playing with other people's money. This is a financial, rather than a legal
"event horizon." Financial markets deal with the possibility that this might
happen in a variety of ways-by discounting the price of debt securities,
increasing interest rates, and, as mentioned above, selling credit derivatives.
152. Id. 95-96.
153. See Hu &Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II, supra note 3o, at 629; Hu &
Black, ledge Funds, nsider, and theDecoupling ofEconomic and Voting Ownership, supra note 3o, at 345.
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But when the risk of insolvency becomes the fact of insolvency, there are legal
consequences as well. This adds considerable complexity to distress situations,
and it is important not to oversimplify.
Different legal regimes deal with this event horizon in different ways.
Most countries force the immediate legal recognition of insolvency, and
trigger the immediate financial realization on the value of the firm. For
example, in the United Kingdom, the law of wrongful trading imposes
additional duties in the zone of insolvency, and may require the debtor to
commence insolvency proceedings upon financial insolvency. s4 Civil law
jurisdictions impose criminal liability on officers and directors if they do not
commence insolvency proceedings in a timely fashion.ss This keeps things
simple. Upon commencing insolvency proceedings in virtually every other
jurisdiction outside the United States, governance is lodged in a fiduciary, and
in many (though not all) of those jurisdictions, the job of the fiduciary is to
liquidate the firm. 56
This is not the rule in the United States. S7 There is no requirement that
an insolvent firm commence a bankruptcy proceeding, nor is a bankruptcy
proceeding predicated on a finding of insolvency. 58 Even once a proceeding
is opened in the United States, Chapter 1i1 is designed to allow for the delay
of financial realization of the firm's value. Nonetheless, there is a congeries
of legal doctrines under U.S. law that confirm that the nature of the
debtor/creditor relation changes upon insolvency.'59 Because realization of
value is delayed, however, the governance situation is considerably muddied.
As we have discussed above,,6o the filing of bankruptcy expressly transfers
governance power to creditors. This means that, at least in the United States,
financial insolvency creates an expectation, even before a debtor files for
bankruptcy, that when one purchases debt one is purchasing an ownership
interest. Dollars become shares of ownership. Indeed, one may even be
purchasing debt with the goal of becoming the owner of the firm, and/or with
the expectation of exercising the attendant governance rights in the event of
a bankruptcy filing.
154. See, e.g., Grantv. Rails [2o16] EWHC (Ch) 1812, [2016] B.C.C. 581 1582] (Eng.).
155. For a helpful discussion of the duties of officers and directors when a firm is in the zone
of insolvency, see UNITED NATIONS COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE ILAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW: PART FOUR: DIRECTORs' OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD APPROACHING
INSOLVENCY 9 (2013), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-
Part4 -ebook-E.pdf.
156. Id.
157. Some states do recognize a cause of action against corporate officers and directors 
for
"deepening insolvency." See, e.g., Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340, 347-48 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Pennsylvania law); Forman v. Salzano (In re
Norvergence, Inc.), 405 B.R. 709, 758-759 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2009) (applying NewJersey law).
158. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109,301 (2012).
159. Jacoby &Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 4, at 711-14-
I6o. See supra Section II.C.
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At first glance, this may seem unremarkable. The genius of markets is
that once control rights shift from one class of securities to another it should
be reflected in market prices. But it's not that simple. Control does not work
the same way in bankruptcy as it does outside. The legal governance regime
shifts upon filing of a bankruptcy petition, where corporate law voting rules
are replaced by the plan confirmation process and by the practical dynamics
of a Chapter i i case.
2. Control Mechanisms in Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Perversely, creditors in bankruptcy may have more powerful governance
rights than shareholders. Classification of claims and voting rules create
multiple opportunities to create blocking positions. Even secured creditors(still fixed claimants with respect to their collateral) can exercise a limited
veto.'6' Furthermore, a variety of additional policy concerns come into play in
the vicinity of insolvency-shifting fiduciary duties, distorted valuations,
concerns about equality of distribution and hence value allocation, and
concerns about the timing of realization of various rights. In this section, we
give those concerns additional consideration and suggest that they may
require a rethinking of the allocation of governance rights in bankruptcy.
The transition for creditors from passive investors to claimants with
control rights begins before the filing of bankruptcy. Upon default (either of
payment or through a covenant default), creditors get the right to pull the
plug on the debtors' operations. This power is actually more extreme than
the shareholder's right to vote on important corporate decisions. The
unsecured creditor can seek a judgment. Any steps to execute on thatjudgment, by levying, or recording the lien against real property starts a go-
day preference avoidance clock. 6 2 This lights the bankruptcy fuse, so to
speak. Creditors can join in filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition,' 63 and
secured creditors can commence self-help repossession and foreclosure.
Outside of bankruptcy, almost everybody has a veto power over a consensual
workout or restructuring; holdout and other coordination problems
abound.' 64 In the absence of Chapter i 1, insolvency triggers a winding up and
realization for creditors.
161. This point is not immediately obvious. Why would creditors get greater governance
rights in bankruptcy than a shareholder would outside of bankruptcy? The reasons are
complicated. But the key point is that outside of bankruptcy, the creditor has the right to insist
on payment in full. That ability to insist on payment in full creates a holdout veto that bankruptcy
seeks to manage-not through majority voting of shares, but through class voting, which works
differently.
i62. See Is U.S.C. § 547 (allowing avoidance of preferential transfers to or for the benefit of
non-insiders made within go days before the commencement of the bankruptcy).
163- Id. 303.
164. See, e.g., Bratton & Levitin, supra note 46, at 1604.
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Chapter 1i limits these draconian rights in order to preserve value
through a collective solution. Practical power is traded for more formal, but
equally important, governance rights. The quid pro quo is complicated. In
return for limitation on their non-bankruptcy veto rights, creditors are given
an assurance of a baseline entitlement (best interests and cramdown) and of
equitable/equal treatment. 6 5 As such, the governance rights accorded to
creditors should be tailored to accomplish these goals.
Creditors' governance rights in bankruptcy are, nonetheless,
considerably greater than the relatively modest powers of shareholders to vote
on directors and to approve extraordinary corporate transactions. Once the
debtor is in bankruptcy, unsecured creditors have the power to object to non-
ordinary course transactions, 6 and to vote on the plan, 6 7 and they may be
able to obtain a blocking position depending on classification.
Voting rights in bankruptcy are not as simple as shareholder rights.
Bankruptcy voting is by class,,68 and creditors are separately classified for a
variety of reasons. 69 Only classes whose claims are impaired get to vote, and
plan confirmation requires an affirmative vote by dual majorities either in all
impaired classes or in at least one impaired class excluding insider votes (in
which case the plan is then subject to additional substantive restrictions).7o
For an impaired class of creditors to accept a plan requires acceptance of the
plan by over one-half of the number of claims in the class and at least
two-thirds of the dollar amount of the claims in the class.17'
In other words, control of a class for acceptance requires a higher
threshold than at corporate law (generally a simple majority of shares).
Conversely, blocking is easier: achieving a one-third (plus $i) interest in
terms of face amount in a class of claims (or one-half in number of claims)
confers a limited right to block a plan. 72 The fact that blocking a plan
requires a lower threshold of control than accepting a plan is particularly
important given that creditors who are net short of a debtor are likely to want
to block a plan. Outside of limited statutory requirements, the debtor initially
has the exclusive right to propose a plan,7'3 so a short is unlikely to push for
plan acceptance, at least initially.
165. in U.S.C. § 7 26(b) (denoting pro rata distribution within class); id. § 1122 (asserting
that classes must contain only similar creditors); id. § 1123(a) (4) (providing for equal treatment
within classes); id. § 129(a) (7) (applying the best interests test); id. § 1s2 9 (b) (asserting the
"fair and equitable" requirement of cramdown).
166. Id. § 3 6 3 (b) ().
167. Id. § 1 126.
168. Id. § 126(c)-(d).
169. Id. § 1 122 (providing classification standards).
170. Id.§§ I 126(f), 1129(a)(8), 1129(a) (to), Ia 9 (b).
171. Id. § 1i26(c).
172. See id.
173. Id. § 1 121 (b)-(c).
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Secured creditors may not foreclose immediately when the bankruptcy is
filed, but they may be able to lift the automatic stay and subsequently
foreclose.'74 They may also be able to assert control over the debtor's cash
through negotiations over the use of cash collateral, and the ability to block
post-petition financing.'75 Similarly, they too have a limited right to block a
plan through voting if impaired. 76
The Bankruptcy Code trades a creditor's practical veto and exit rights for
a voice on how to realize value-that is, in the firm's governance. In doing so,
they create myriad ways in which a creditor can obstruct a plan. Most of these
are by design. In many cases, however, these blocking positions can create
anticommons and other coordination problems. Worse yet, modern claims
trading markets may fundamentally alter the landscape, particularly when
linked to derivatives.
3. Insolvency, Claims Trading and the Control Premium
Claims against insolvent entities trade at a discount from face amount.
This makes sense given the reduced probability of a return. But, as noted
above, they can still carry with them a control premium. Part of the value of
the claim lies in the entitlement to a distribution that it represents, but when
linked to a control position, part of the value lies in the ability to steer the
case, or hold it hostage. This power may allow the claimant to demand a
premium as part of its distribution, use its leverage to benefit its position in
another class, or capitalize on a short position. 77
As the price of debt changes, so does the price of control. This is not
intrinsically problematic. In equity markets, for example, changes in the price
of stock do not change the governance rights associated with that share. As a
result, the cost of gaining control rises and falls with the price of the stock. As
we have noted above, governance and veto rights function differently in
bankruptcy. Obstruction is easier, sometimes by design, sometimes not.'78 It
therefore merits consideration whether the power to block a plan ought to be
limited when claims are purchased at a steep discount.
First, where debt is trading at a steep discount, control rights or veto
rights may be purchased on the cheap. This is problematic in the first instance
because it may make it too easy to purchase "holdout" power. This holdout
power can be used by the claims purchaser to seek to extort a
disproportionate amount of the value of the firm from other creditors. Worse
yet, when linked to the ability to create "empty" or short positions linked to
control, the result may not just be reallocation of value, but its destruction.
174. Id. § 3 62(d).
175. Id. §§ 363(c), 36 4 (d).
176. Id. § 1126.
177. See supra Section IIF.3 -
178. See supra Section II.G.2.
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These differences between solvent companies and firms in bankruptcy are, in
our view, sufficient to justify consideration of a bankruptcy specific approach
to conflicts of interest, holdouts, and specifically, Trojan Horse creditors.
But there's more; claims trading allows for the trading of veto rights, and
hence the power to hold out. Vetoes have value, and make some votes more
valuable than others when traded. This, in and of itself, implicates the
Bankruptcy Code's principle of equal treatment. Control rights are a
mechanism for firm governance, not an asset of a particular creditor. If
anything, they are an asset of the class of creditors. But, by definition, control
rights cannot be traded equally, as they reflect a power to veto or bind an
action desired by other members of the same class. We develop this
complication in the next section.
III. CLAIMs TRADING-EQUAL TREATMENT, REALIZATION, AND
GOVERNANCE RIGHTS
Because claims trading enables a market in control rights in bankruptcy,
the filing of a bankruptcy petition produces a governance problem that
bumps into the fundamental bankruptcy policy of equal treatment for similar
creditors. This is a second and distinct governance distortion caused by claims
trading.
A. EQUAL TREATMENT
In a recent article, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter
iI, one of us (anger) and Melissa jacoby explored at length the meaning of
the term "equity," as used in state law and in the Bankruptcy Code.79 We
explained that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a form of
"realization." so Liquidation in bankruptcy operates as a realization of value,
and distribution according to the legal status of the claimants on the petition
date. The genius of Chapter ii is that it allows realization of the firm's value
to be delayed, where doing so is in the best interest of the estate. However,
the quid pro quo is that the principle of equal treatment will be respected,
and it is, thus, a basic principle of bankruptcy that similarly treated creditors
should be treated similarly.1' However Chapter i1 creates a problem.
Reorganization over time does not necessarily affect all types of claims in the
same way. Encumbered assets may increase or decrease in value during the
case, or be sold. The value of the firm may increase, through operations or
asset appreciation, or it may decline. It is, therefore, not obvious how to
manage the principle of equal treatment over time.
179. See generalyJacoby&Janger, TracingEquiy, sura note 4 (discussing equity in bankruptcy law).
i8o. See id. at 682-709.
18i. See 1' U.S.C. § 7 26(b) (requiring pro rata treatment for creditors of similar priority);
id. § 1122 (explaining that only similar claims may be classified together); id. § i123(a) (4)
(requiring equal treatment for all claims in a class); id. § 112 9 (b) (prohibiting unfair
discrimination in cramdown).
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In Tracing Equity, Jacoby and Janger explain that the Code gives effect to
equal treatment over time by splitting the process of "realization" in two
-fixing the relative position of claimants on the petition date ("Equitable
Realization"), but determining the value of those claims at a variety of later
dates ("Value Realization")., 8 The Bankruptcy Code treats the filing of the
bankruptcy petition as an "equitable realization"; the baseline for equal
treatment is established on the date of the bankruptcy petition. For unsecured
creditors, the relative pro-rata position of claims as of the petition date is
enforced through the disallowance of claims for unmatured interest. 83
Similarly, the relative positions of asset-based (secured) claimants and
unsecured claimants with regard to firm value are fixed on the petition date
through the discontinuation of floating liens and equitable limitations placed
on a secured creditors' interest in proceeds. 84 Thus, increases in firm value
attributable to operations are distributed pro rata among the unsecured
creditors, while asset based priority claims are tied to assets owned on the
petition date. For secured creditors, this means that the pool of encumbered
assets (collateral) is fixed on the petition date, as is the value of those assets.
That value is entitled to adequate protection, for downside purposes, but any
appreciation is measured at the time the asset is actually sold, or upon the
effective date of the plan, whichever is earlier. i85 In other words, for a secured
creditor, their allowed secured claim is realized for downside purposes on the
petition date, but for upside purposes, upon disposition of the asset.
B. CONTROL, COLLA TERAL AND EQUAL TREATMENT: T- PROBLEM OF
CREDIT BIDDING
Up until now, we have been looking at situations where a claims trader
attempts to purchase the "fulcrum" security to gain governance rights. The
idea of the fulcrum security is a corporate governance principle based in
corporate finance. The idea is that the junior-most class of claims that is "in
the money" (that is to say, eligible for a distribution) should control the firm's
governance because it is the residual claimant. Increases in value redound to
its benefit, and declines in value occur at its expense. Bankruptcy law
generally respects this view, and as a result, the focus of our governance
concern has been on the purchase ofjunior debt claims.
There is another claims trading context that implicates the equality of
distribution. Secured credit is both more and less powerful as a governance
device. On the one hand, the secured creditor receives a distributional
priority with regard to the value of its collateral in the form of an allowed
182. Jacoby &Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 4, at 688, 694.183. 11 U.S.C. § 5 02(b) (2).
184. Id. § 552(a) (explaining the discontinuation of floating liens); id. § 5 5 2(b) (discussingthe effect of a security interest postpetition); seejacoby &Janger, TracingEquity, supra note 4, at 706.
185. SeeJacoby &Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 4, at 688.
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secured claim. As a result, the secured claim is usually separately classified,
and therefore votes in its own class. In addition to having the right to vote its
claim as a member of a class, however, it also has governance rights that arise
as a result of its lien on particular assets. In particular, if the assets are being
sold as part of the plan or in a sale under Section 363 of the Code, the secured
creditor generally has the right to credit bid its claim,
86 meaning that secured
creditor can offset its claim against its bid in a 363 sale, effectively making the
secured creditor's debt the price to beat at the sale. 87 The right to credit bid
was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court,'
88 but courts have
subsequently explored the limits of that right in a way that mirrors our
concerns.'89
The problem arises when an undersecured creditor who does not have a
lien on all of the assets of the debtor seeks to credit bid at a going concern
sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets. If the gap between the value of
the assets and the amount of the secured creditor's debt is large enough, the
credit bid may allow the secured party to purchase the firm at a substantial
discount.
To illustrate, suppose that a secured creditor has a lien on many, but not
all of the debtor's assets. Those assets are worth $1o million, if liquidated by
themselves, and secure a $16 million debt. The debtor's other assets, not
subject to the lien, are worth $2 million if liquidated by themselves. If the
debtor were sold as a going concern, however, it would be worth $15 million.
In this case, should the secured creditor be allowed to credit bid for $16
million (the face amount of its debt), or merely $io million (the realizable
value of its collateral)?19o If the secured creditor can credit bid $16 million, it
will win the auction because no other party would rationally bid higher than
$15 million. The result, then, would be to allow the undersecured creditor to
capture $5 million of value not tied to its collateral (the realizable value of
unencumbered assets plus the bankruptcy-created going-concern sale value)
and to which it has no priority entitlement.
186. i 1 U.S.C. § 3 6 3 (k). Credit bidding may be restricted "for cause." Id.
187. We note here that credit bidding in bankruptcy is technically different than 
credit
bidding in a state law foreclosure. State law foreclosure sales will by definition be of only a
creditor's collateral, not other non-collateral assets. LEVITIN, sufra note 39, at 42. In contrast, a
bankruptcy sale may include assets that extend beyond a creditor's collateral package.
188. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012).
189. We also note the possibility of debtor in possession financing agreements, which are
approved by court order, II U.S.C. § 364, contractually requiring the DIP lender's right to credit
bid be preserved. We believe such a contractual limitation should be void as against public policy.
See id. § 3 64 (a)-(f).
igo. The language of § 3 6 3 (k) does not definitely resolve this issue because it refers to
property that is subject to a lien that secures an "allowed claim" and the offset of "such claim",
without clarifying if this the claim referenced isjust the allowed secured claim or the entire allowed
claim, particularly if there has not been a determination of the value of the creditor's collateral
yet. See id. § 3 6 3 (k).
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This concern is not theoretical. In Free Lance-Star, a potential buyer of the
debtor, a newspaper, purchased the senior lenders claim, including its
liens.19, The goal of the claim purchaser was to use its ownership of the
secured debt to exercise control over the bankruptcy and to use the right to
credit bid to purchase the company in a 363 sale.192 How the court remedied
this problem will be discussed below.
C. CLAIMS, THE CONTROL PREMIUM, AND EQUAL TREMEA -rr
The lesson of this Article, so far, is that control positions, created by liens,
as above, or by owning a blocking (one-third of a class) or accepting (two-
thirds of a class), have value. A claims purchaser will pay extra for a block of
claims that come with the power to influence the case-to become a bully or
a Trojan Horse. But a question remains. How should the value of a control
premium be allocated? In the previous sections, we established that those
rights should not be exercisable on behalf of someone whose interest conflicts
with the estate or members of the claimant's class.'93 But even when the
interest of the holder aligns with the estate, how should the value of "control"
be distributed to members of the relevant class?
Before one can answer, one must first distinguish pure "economic exit"
from a sale where part of the price includes a "control premium." There is
really no basis for objecting to pure economic exit. If an investor thinks that
a claim, or the debtor, is undervalued, basic market principles suggest that
selling the claim should be allowed. By contrast, the reasons are not so strong
where the price of a claim includes a control premium. In order to see why, it
is helpful to list the various reasons that "control" might have value, over and
above the economic value of a claim. We can identify the following reasons:
* Claimants might hold an interest elsewhere in the capital
structure and wish to maximize the value of that claim at the
expense of the holders of claimants in a particular class.
* Claimants might wish to capture value of an asset synergy,
for example an adjoining landowner wishing to put together
an assemblage, or a related firm looking to increase market
share.
* Claimants might have a legitimate disagreement about how
best to maximize the value of the debtor or the distribution
to the class.
The first motivation, based on our previous discussion, is aimed directly
at violating equality of distribution as these Claimants increase their
distribution at the expense of the rest of the class or another class. The second
191. In re Free Lance-Star Publ'g Co. of Fredericksburg, 512 B.R. 798, Soo (Ban kr. E.D. Va. 2014).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
193. See supra Sections II.C-.E, ILF. i, IIG.3 -
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rationale is more ambiguous. The asset synergy has positive value, but the
control premium would allow the owner of the synergy to use its governance
rights in the debtor to capture that value at the expense of the estate (and
other creditors). In other words, both of these reasons for exiting are
candidates for limitation of governance rights, either through separate
classification or limitation of voting rights.
Only the third rationale reflects an honest disagreement about how to
maximize the distribution to the class. For this limited class of situations alone,
there is not a concern about equality of distribution. The question then
becomes how to distinguish such honest disagreements from hold-out
behavior. In our view, the best way to solve both of these problems is by
preventing the sale of control rights at the time of exit. We will explain how
this is done below.
D. THE PRiE oF TiE CONTRoL PREMIUM AND EQUAL TREATMENT
Even for claims purchases in the third category-honest disagreement
about how to maximize value-the principle of equal treatment is implicated.
During the course of a case, the price of debt may change-and so will the
price of the control premium.
At first glance that would not appear to be problematic. In equity
markets, for example, the market for corporate control relies on the fact that
share valuation will determine when takeovers will, happen. Similarly, if we are
willing to tolerate economic exit, then the changing price of the debt will
affect the distribution that selling creditors get depending on the time they
exit. But, where a control premium is involved, there is a different problem.
The opportunity to capture the premium is not available to the entire class,
and again, if the price changes over time, the relative distributions will
change.
Moreover, the control premium is not evenly distributed across all class
members. The holders of the first one-third (plus $1) of the amount of a class
of debt to tender their claims can "sell" a blocking position." So can the
holders of the second one-third (plus $1), albeit to someone else. The holders
of the remaining one-third (minus $2) are left out in the cold. Conversely,
the holders of two-thirds of the amount of a class of debt have the ability to
sell the power to "accept." The remaining one-third are, again, left out in the
cold, with no ability to block a plan through the vote.
This ability to distribute the value of a control premium unequally also
violates the principle of equal treatment and allows one subset of the
claimants to extract value from another. This potential inequality manifests
upon insolvency. While there is no general legal commitment to equal
treatment outside of bankruptcy, it is a baseline distributional principle that
equality of treatment is measured as of bankruptcy day once the debtor
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files. 94 The relative position of creditors should not change. The ability of a
first mover to grab that premium at the expense of other similar creditors
violates the principle of equal treatment. As bankruptcy law polices even pre-
bankruptcy grabs by first movers, 95 afortioriit does not brook post-bankruptcy
grabs.
In sum, we are concerned that the trading of claims at a discount after
insolvency can cause problems in two ways. First, it facilitates the
accumulation of control and blocking positions that might be linked to shorts,
resulting in Schadenfreude creditors becoming "bullies," and worse yet, Trojan
Horse creditors.'9 6 Second, because this power can be traded separately from
a claim's distributional rights, it allows for the reallocation of the control
premium among similarly situated creditors after the case has been filed. As
we will discuss below, while these two concerns are distinct, they can be
remedied by a single family of remedies that we call, collectively, "mark-to-
market" governance. 97 In the next two sections, we will describe the existing
mechanisms for dealing with distorted governance incentives and show why
they are inadequate. Then we will describe our preferred approach.
IV. EXISTING REMEDIES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
To the extent that conflicts of interest and governance distortions caused
by claims trading are to be solved by law, there are a number of possible
approaches that might be tried in various contexts, individually, or in
combination. They are: (i) mandating disclosure; (2) limiting the voting
power of creditors to correct the mismatch between voting power and
economic interest; (3) limiting the alienability of claims; and (4) limiting the
creditors' distribution through subordination or disallowance. Each of these
remedies is available to some extent within the Bankruptcy Code as currently
written. Each also has certain limitations and possible unintended
consequences. In this section, we address each separately.
A. DISCLOSURE
One proposed method for dealing with distorted governance incentives
would be mandatory disclosure of economic interests.,9 8 Mandatory
disclosure of hedges is the method currently used for addressing distorted
194. See ] U.S.C. §§ 726(b), 1129(a) (7).
195. Id. § 547 (allowing for the "avoidance of preferential transfers" (quoting ii U.S.C.§ 547 note (Historical and Revision Notes: Legislative Statements)).
196. See supra Part II.
197. See infra Section V.B.
198. See Kevin J. Coco, Note, Empty Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 and
Ownership Disclosure in Chapter ii Cases, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 6 1 o, 613 (proposing disclosure
of hedges); Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II, supra note 30, at 731-33;Hu & Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 3o, at 684-85.
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governance incentives of originators, sponsors, and servicers of asset-backed
securities. 99
Under current Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 3001,
creditors must disclose (under penalty of perjury) the amount they are owed
and assert that they are the person entitled to receive payment.
2
oo Creditors,
however, do not need to disclose how much they paid to acquire the claim,
whether they have assigned all or part of their right to receive payment to
somebody else, or whether they have insured or otherwise hedged part of the
risk.
Members of both official and unofficial or ad hoc committees2o are
subject to certain enhanced disclosure requirements under Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 as controversially amended in 2011.202
These entities must disclose "the nature and amount of each disclosable
economic interest held in relation to the debtor as of the date the .. . group
or committee was formed," including the acquisition date by quarter and year
for any interest acquired in the previous year.
2 0 3 "Disclosable economic
interest" is defined broadly as "any claim, interest, pledge, lien, option,
participation, derivative instrument, or any other right or derivative right
granting the holder an economic interest that is affected by the value,
acquisition, or disposition of a claim or interest."204 The Rule 2019 disclosure
requirement is on-going,205 and is backed up by a threat of sanctions,
including refusing to hear the motions of the non-compliant entities, and
invalidating any votes made by the non-compliant entities.o
6 To ensure
compliance, the disclosure requirement applies not only to the actual claim
holders, but to any party that represents them, that is, to attorneys.
2 0 7
Requiring disclosure is a partial solution to the conflicted creditor
problem because it eliminates false signaling. Disclosure does not, however,
199. See supra notes accompanying Section II.B. The SEC Registration AB II disclosure
requirements are backed up by both the threat of private class action litigation and public SEC
enforcement. Bankruptcy lacks an analogous public enforcement mechanism.
200. SeeFED.R.BANKR.P. 3ooi.
201. An "ad hoc" committee is merely two or more creditors that pursue any motion or action
jointly in the bankruptcy. See Richard J. Corbi et al., New Rule 2019: Distressed Investors, What Are
You Hlolding?, AM. BANKR. INST.J.,June 201 1, at 14, 14.
202. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019; see also Corbi et al., supra note 201, at 14 (noting the "vigorous
debate" over the amendment of Rule 2019).
203. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(c) (2) (B)-(C).
204. Id. R. 2oi9(a)(i).
205. Id. R. 201 9 (d).
206. Id. R. 2019(e) (2).
207. See id. R. 20 19(a) Committee's Note to 201 1 Amendment (noting that "an attorney who
is retained and consulted by a creditor or equity security holder to monitor the case, but who
does not advocate any position before the court or engage in solicitation activities on behalf of
that client, does not represent the creditor or equity security holder for purposes of this rule").
The implication is that an attorney who does appear before the court is subject to the rule's
disclosure requirements if representing a group.
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prevent a creditor with a conflict from obstructing a workout or from voting
its claim to block a plan, nor does it eliminate the tension between fiduciary
duty and self-interest that arises when the creditor is serving on a committee.
Moreover, as Rule 2019 disclosure requirements currently exist, they do
not apply to most creditors. Rule 2019 applies only to "[giroups,
[c]ommittees, and [e]ntities" that represent multiple creditors.2o8 Thus, there
is no disclosure requirement for individual creditors, as long as they do not
act in concert. As a result, courts lack the information necessary to police the
actions of individual creditors.
For example, in Lyondell Chemical's bankruptcy, the court was powerless
in the absence of mandated disclosure, despite the bankruptcy judge noting
that a trade publication had reported that certain noteholders had
undertaken actions to precipitate the bankruptcy to collect on their credit
default swaps.2 0 9 Judge Gerber lamented:
I'm not in a position to make a factual finding as to the truth of this
report; newspaper articles are hearsay, and the parties' (and the
Court's) inability to know all of the facts as to this is one of the many
manifestations of the opacity of the use of derivatives in bankruptcy
cases.2 10
Finally, even if the Rule 2og disclosure requirements were universal, the
remedial provisions backing up the requirements are discretionary.2
B. LIMITING THE FRANCHISE
A second mechanism for addressing the decoupling of governance rights
and economic interest is to limit those governance rights directly.2"2 Again,
there are existing mechanisms under current law: separate classification and
designation. Both of these remedies capitalize on the fact that, under Chapter
i i's plan confirmation process, governance rights are exercised as a member
of a class, and classes accept or reject a plan based on specific supermajority
rules.21s Under Section 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code, creditors may only be
classified together for voting purposes if their claims are "substantially
208. Id.R.2oig(b)(L).
209. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Servs. Inc. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.),
402 B.R. 571, 585 n.26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
210. Id.
211. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(e) (authorizing, but not requiring various remedies for
violations of Rule 2019).
21 2. See Patrick D. Fleming, Credit Derivatives Can Create a Financial Incentive for Creditors to
Destroy a Chapter ii Debtor. Section Il 26(e) and Section 105(a) Provide a Solution, I 7 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 189, 189 (2009); Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II, supra note
3o, at 735 ("[V]oting rights in bankruptcy may need to be based on net economic ownership
instead of gross ownership of debt. . . .").
213. 11 U.S.C.§ 1126(c)-(d) (2012).
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similar."214 Under Section 1126, a class of claims only accepts a plan if its
members vote by "more than one-half in number" and "at least two-thirds in
amount" to accept.2 '5 Finally, also under Section 1126, a vote may be
"designate [d]" or disregarded if it is cast in bad faith.21
6 Under these
principles, a hedged claim might need to be classified separately from
unhedged claims, or a creditor who is economically short might have its vote
designated as cast in bad faith.
These tools have a lot to commend them. They largely eliminate the
ability of a creditor to use voting rights to harm the estate for its own benefit.
Disenfranchisement of conflicted creditors is also consistent with bankruptcy
policy as reflected in other Code provisions. Section 702 of the Bankruptcy
Code disenfranchises parties with "interest[s] materially adverse" to other
creditors' as well as insiders from voting in the election of a trustee.
2 17 Section
1129(a) (io) disenfranchises insiders (who are presumed to have conflicting
interests) from voting on "cramdown" plans, which may be approved with the
consent of only a single impaired class of creditors."'
8
The principal weaknesses of both classification and designation lie in the
difficulty of administering them. Separate classification solves the signaling
problem caused by empty creditors without depriving the creditor of all its
rights. While it may not be able to block confirmation by eliminating an
impaired accepting class, it does leave the creditor with the ability to block
consensual confirmation and force a cramdown. Indeed, separate
classification may actually increase a conflicted creditor's ability to block a
consensual plan because its claims will constitute a larger percentage, or even
all, of the separate class.
214. Id.§ §122(a).
215. Id. § 1 126(c). A class of equity interests accepts a plan by a vote of two-thirds of amount.
Id. § 1 126(d).
216. Id.§1126(e).
217. Id. § 702(a)(2)-(3).
218. Id. § 1129(a)(10). Section i129(a)(io) applies to all Chapter ii plans, but for
"consensual" plans under §I 129(a) it is subsumed in almost all cases by the vote required under
§ g129(a)(8), which requires the acceptance of all impaired classes. See id. § 1129(a)(8).
Cramdown plans under § i 1 29 (b) still require the acceptance of a single impaired class under
§ 129(a) (so), but dispense with the requirement of all impaired classes accepting under
§ 1129 (a)(8).Id.§ 1I29 (b)(1).
These tools are consistent with the Trust Indenture Act. The Trust Indenture Act is a
federal securities statute governing SEC-registered debt securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 aaa- 7 7bbbb
(201 2). The Trust Indenture Act imposes restrictions on the restructuring of such debt securities
with the purpose of forcing most restructuring into bankruptcy where it can proceed with under
the watchful eye of the court subject to various procedural and substantive safeguards. Id.
§ 77ppp. While some of the Trust Indenture Act's restrictions are waivable only by individual
security holders, others are waivable by various majority votes. Compare id. § 77ppp(b)
(proscribing rights waivable only by individual security holders), with id. § 77ppp (a) (proscribing
rights waivable by vote of majority of security holders).
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Designation also solves the false signaling problem by identifying the
creditor's conflict, but is quite harsh, in that it deprives the creditor of any
voting rights whatsoever.2'9 Both classification and designation are binary
remedies with uncertain triggers. Both can therefore be over- and under-
inclusive. As we will discuss below, another possibility might be partial
designation-to mark a creditors' voting right down to its real economic
interest in the debtor. In other words, a creditor that has hedged one-third of
its risk might be allowed to vote only one-third of its claim.
A common attribute of all disenfranchisement mechanisms is that none
of them work without a robust disclosure regime. Unless a creditor has
disclosed its position, or another creditor has uncovered that position and
disclosed it to the court, none of these remedies can be imposed. As a result,
in order to work, it may be necessary to impose a general requirement that
creditors with significant positions provide continuous disclosure of changes
in their economic interest in the debtor. This is particularly true of the vote
dilution mechanism we advocate below. However, the remedy we propose is
also more nuanced and need not have a specific trigger, but can be applied
continuously.22o
C. TRADING BARs
A straightforward solution to most of these problems would be to simply
bar trading in claims once a debtor has filed for bankruptcy. Trading bars
already routinely exist for members of official committees, which are privy to
extensive non-public information about the debtor.221 In a number of cases,
courts have also issued orders restricting and monitoring trading in order to
preserve the estate's tax losses.222
Broad trading bars would have considerable secondary market effects
both on the market in bankruptcy claims and on pre-petition distressed debt
markets. The effect is likely to be ambiguous, however. On the one hand,
would-be buyers and sellers would fear being trapped in an illiquid position
in the event of bankruptcy, which would drive down the price of the debt,
thereby ironically opening the door for Schadenfreude investors to purchase at
a pittance. Alternatively, this risk might be priced into the debt ex ante and
2 i 9. The leading bankruptcy treatise posits that designation under § 11 26(e) cannot be partial,
but must be done in 1oto, but provides no caselaw support for the interpretation of the Code.
7 COLLIER ON BANKRUFECYj 1 1 26.06[3] (Richard Levin & HenryJ. Sommer eds., i6th ed. 2018).
22o. We note that our proposed solution-like the existing tools-would apply only in
bankruptcy. This means that none of them will limit the ability of a "short" to engage in
obstruction prior to bankruptcy. Also, by diluting or limiting the governance rights upon
bankruptcy, some claims may be more valuable outside of bankruptcy than in bankruptcy, and
vice versa, though subject to the "shadow of bankruptcy."
221. See Levitin, supra note 29, at 75.
222. Paul D. Leake & Mark G. Douglas, TradingRestrictions in Bankruptcy: Did the Seventh Circuit
Up the Antefor Stock Trading Injunctions? 1i PRATT'SJ. BANKR. L. 280, 285 (2005) -
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lead to more accurate pricing of debt and, perhaps greater cooperation by
creditors on the eve of bankruptcy.
D. LIMITATION OF DISTRIBUTION
Finally, where a creditor has engaged in some form of bad behavior,
there are existing mechanisms for limiting their distribution through
equitable subordination or disallowance of a claim.223 These remedies exist
under current law224 and are not based on conflicts of interest per se, but
instead on the behavior that might result from such conflicts. As such, alone
among the mechanisms discussed here, they can be used as a mechanism for
punishing prepetition behavior that harmed the estate. The problem,
however, is that these remedies generally have a high trigger, requiring fairly
egregious facts.
E. PROBLEMS WTII TIIE CURRENT REMEDIES
While the existing remedies are all, to one degree or another, aimed at
the right problems, they are not well adapted to the current trading
environment and current modes of financing. Either they: (1) are blunt and
overly broad instruments with undesirable collateral effects; (2) impose too
high a trigger, so cannot address the pervasiveness of the problem; or (3) are
unworkable because the current regime does not provide sufficient
transparency.
In our view, the bluntness problem lies in the linkage between
distribution and governance. The existing remedies are not well tailored to
the governance problem that we have raised. For example, disallowance limits
the claimant's distribution rights and governance rights, when the problem
lies in governance alone. The same is true of this linkage when one reduces
the allowed amount of a claim to the price for which it was purchased. This
solves the governance problem, but undercuts the liquidity of claims.225
Subordination, perversely, is more likely to affect distribution (by putting the
claimant out of the money) than governance. The separately classified
subordinated claim still votes, but it most likely will be separately classified,
223. I U.S.C. § 510(c) (referring to equitable subordination); see also Pepper v. Litton, 3o8
U.S. 295, 302 (1939) (discussing equitable subordination and disallowance).
224. The status of equitable disallowance under current law is somewhat unclear; some
courts have authorized it. See Adelphia Recovery Tr. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 39o B.R. 64, 76
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), adhered to on reconsideration, No. 05 CIV. 9 050(LMM), 2008 WL 1959542, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2oo8); In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 256 (Bankr. D. Del. 201 1), vacated
in part, No. 08-12229 MFW, 2012 WL 1563880, at *16--19 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012). But
equitable disallowance lacks express statutory authorization in contrast to equitable
subordination. See Alan M. Ahart, Wy the Equitable Disallowance of Claims in Bankruptcy Must Be
Disallowed, 2o AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 445, 460 (2012).
225. As we will discuss later, our goal is to develop an approach where claims trade based on
the economic value of the asset itself, rather than based on a control premium. The benefits of
control are owned by all of the creditors.
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which ironically increases its voting power because voting is done by classes,
enabling the equitably subordinated creditor to force a cramdown
determination by voting against the plan. Finally, complete designation
deprives the stakeholder of all governance rights when they may still have a
meaningful economic interest that deserves to be represented. Each of these
remedies is inadequately tailored in that they tend to be "all or, nothing."
Moreover, they link and delink governance and distribution in ways that do
not necessarily deal with the evil to be addressed.
The second problem with the existing remedies is that they are difficult
to trigger. All of the existing remedies are viewed as extraordinary
punishments for damaging creditor behavior, rather than routine
adjustments to implement "one dollar, one vote." For example, equitable
subordination requires both inequitable conduct and unfair advantage to the
subordinated creditor or injury to other creditors." 6 Statutory disallowance
generally requires the claim to be invalid under applicable non-bankruptcy
law.227 It is unsettled whether equitable disallowance remains a viable doctrine
under the current Bankruptcy Code, '8 but if so, it would require seriously
inequitable conduct. Designation requires bad faith."9 In our view,
misbehavior is beside the point because the signaling problem resulting from
creditors holding exogenous interests exists irrespective of bad behavior.
A final problem with the existing approach is that there are insufficient
mechanisms to ensure transparency. Existing Rule 2oig imposes some
disclosure obligations on members of official committees and ad hoc
committees, 23o but those obligations are limited, and can readily be avoided
by eschewing committee membership. A generally applicable disclosure
requirement would eliminate much of the false signaling, but it is also
necessary to implement the more tailored approach that we will describe
below.23
226. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5 th Cir. 1977).227. 1 1 U.S.C. § 502 (b) (i).
228. Compare Harbinger Capital Partners LLC v. Ergen (In re LightSquared Inc.), 504 B.R.
321, 339 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that there is no equitable disallowance under the
Bankruptcy Code), with Adelphia Recovery Tr., 39o B.R. at 74, 8o (affirming bankruptcy court's
denial of motion to dismiss claim for equitable disallowance), and In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 46 1 B.R.
at 258, 267 (denying motion to dismiss and concluding that bankruptcy court has the authority
to disallow claim on equitable grounds), vacated in part upon settlement of parties, No. o8-i 2229
(MFW), 2012 WL 1563880, at *29 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 201 2).
229. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e).
230. SeeFED.R.BANKR.P. 2019(b).
231. The situation we address relates to governance in bankruptcy, not post-bankruptcy
governance. Bankruptcy Code § 11 29(a) (5) addresses post-bankruptcy governance by requiring
disclosure of who will be running the company after the plan is confirmed, while § 1123(a) (6)
and 1123(a) (7) impose restrictions on the governance structure of reorganized businesses. See
I I U.S.C. §§ I 23(a) (6)-(7), 1129(a) (5).
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The assumption for all of these remedies is that conflicts only matter if it
can be proven that they were acted upon. Our concern is that these conflicts
are pervasive, and misallocation of governance rights will lead to suboptimal
decision-making. Certainly, such misallocation creates opportunities for
advantage taking, gaming, and misbehavior that will occur far more often
than it can be proven. Our goal, therefore, is to address the root cause, rather
than the symptom.
V. MARK-TO-MARKET GOVERNANCE
The challenge of addressing the empty-creditor and control premium
problems identified above is that they are not just a problem of Schadenfreude
investors deliberately assembling net short positions in a bankruptcy or
Trojan-Horse creditors trying to use control rights and leverage to alter the
bankruptcy priority scheme. There are a wide variety of innocent creditor
behaviors that have the effect of modifying the economic attributes of a claim.
Hedging, assigning, or contracting about debt requires that the debt have
consistent economic attributes. The dollar amount of an unsecured claim
fixes the proportion of the class distribution that the creditor will receive. Any
effective remedy to the empty creditor problem must leave the economic
attributes of the claim intact. Otherwise bankruptcy would destroy the
liquidity of those claims both in bankruptcy and before. To be clear, our
starting point is to leave distributional rights undisturbed.
The challenge, however, suggests the solution. The attributes that must
be preserved undiminished relate to the "economic" attributes of the claims,
not to their "governance" attributes, or at least not to the governance
attributes that grant power in excess of (or in conflict with) economic interest
or that alter the relative distribution of governance rights after insolvency.
The interaction between these two concerns is a bit complex, so we will
illustrate both, and then discuss a common approach to solving them.
A. DIsTRIBuTION v. GOVERNANCE-AN ILLUSTRA77ON
A key set of distinctions throughout this article has been between
economic exit and purchasing control-between distribution and
governance. The two interact in complicated ways that are not fully
incorporated into the existing Bankruptcy Code. Distributional entitlements
and voting rights travel together under current law, but it is not clear that they
should. It is easy to demonstrate why the distributional rights associated with
a claim should not be affected by assignment or hedging. Imagine that a
creditor holds a $10 million unsecured claim. Assume that the likely
distribution in the debtor's bankruptcy is predicted to be $1 million, payable
in two years. The claimant may wish to convert that asset to cash immediately
and might be able to sell it for the present value of $i million two years from
now (perhaps $850,ooo in today's dollars). If the allowed amount of the claim
is discounted to the consideration paid of $850,000, then the distribution on
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account of the purchased claim would only be $85,000 (plus any resulting
increase in the pro-rated dividend, which we will ignore for simplicity's sake),
instead of $1 million. No purchaser would pay $850,000 for a distribution
worth $85,ooo, so the claim would be rendered unsellable. Indeed, the entire
secondary market in bankruptcy claims would collapse if claims were only
allowed at their purchase price. Numerous cases have reaffirmed the principle
that a purchased claim participates, for distributional purposes, at the allowed
face amount of the claim.232
This does not mean, however, that it is not possible (or even desirable)
to make similar adjustments to a claimant's governance rights. A discounting of
governance rights will not render claims unsellable, unlike a discounting of
distribution rights. To the extent the claim was purchased in order to obtain
governance rights (or even the option of governance rights), discounting of
those governance rights will render the claim less attractive to purchasers, but
it will still retain its fundamental economic value. To the extent that
governance power has economic value, that value will be retained for the
benefit of the class. In other words, discounting of governance rights will
reduce a claim's value, but the value of the claim lost will be the governance
premium-the price of the power to distort the distribution to other
creditors, not the entitlement based on the underlying economic rights.
Discounting governance rights will not reduce the overall distribution to
creditors, and to the extent that it preserves the appropriate balance of
governing power within the estate, it may actually produce an increase. This
is because the discounting of governance rights can be used to maintain the
alignment of economic interest among members of a creditor class and to
preserve equality of distribution. To understand how, envision a bankruptcy
case with four unsecured creditors, each with a $1o million claim. The current
best guess at this stage in the bankruptcy is that unsecured claims will
ultimately receive a io% distribution. 33 Here's how things stand:
232. See, e.g., In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 532 BR. 494, 56o (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) ("[T]he
price paid by a secondary purchaser has no impact on its substantive rights... . Were the Court
to accede to the suggestion that secondary purchase prices are relevant, the effect on the
distressed market would be devastating."). The one exception to this is that claims with original
issue discount are allowed only at the amount paid, with the original issue discount treated as
interest included in the allowed claim only to the extent that it is deemed to have matured pre-
petition according to whatever amortization schedule is used. Tex. Commerce Bank, NA v. Licht(In re Pengo Indus., Inc.), 962 F.2d 543, 546-47 (5 th Cir. 1992); LTV Corp. v. Valley Fidelity
Bank & Tr. Co. (In reChateaugay Corp.), 961 F.2d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 1992); Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. UMB Bank, N.A. (In re Residential Capital, LLC), 501 B.R. 549, 557,
585-86 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013); In reSolutia Inc., 379 B.R. 473, 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
233. For simplicity's sake, we ignore the question of when the distribution will take place, as
it will affect the discounting of the distribution to present value. While timing often matters
substantially to creditors, it is not essential for demonstrating our point.
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* The first creditor loaned the debtor $10 million and,
uncontroversially, stands to receive a pro rata distribution of
$1 million based on a claim of that amount.
* The second creditor purchased a $io million claim from
the original lender for $i million and also stands to receive
a pro rata $i million payout.
* The third creditor purchased a $io million claim from the
original lender for $1 million, but then entered into a swap
transaction with a third party under which it was guaranteed
a payment of $1 million because the swap counterparty
would pay the creditor the difference between the amount
the creditor received as a distribution, while the creditor
would pay any amount received over $i million to the swap
counterparty.
* Finally, a fourth creditor purchased a $io million claim
from the original lender for $1 million, but also entered
into three swap contracts under the same terms as the
previous creditor such that it would be paid three times any
decline in value, and would pay three times any increase in
value of the purchased claim.
Each of these creditors (even the first two) has a different economic interest
in the debtor's future.
The first creditor has $io million of value at risk and will strive to
maximize the return for its class in order to maximize its own return. Thus,
the first creditor's interests are aligned with those of similarly situated
unsecured creditors, and with the debtor to the extent that it is in a residual
class of claims.
Whereas the first creditor sees itself as potentially losing $io million, the
second creditor sees only $i million of potential downside risk. It too will seek
to maximize the return for its class in order to maximize its own return, but it
is likely to view various exit strategies in an entirely different light. On one
level, this represents the "sunk cost" fallacy, namely that prospective
investment decisions will be made based on past losses, rather than on
maximizing future returns.2 34 Today, both creditors have the same economic
interest-a claim with a market value of $i million-but they are likely to
behave differently because of how their position is framed. Also, to the extent
that the claim represents governance rights, these governance rights were
purchased at a bargain price.
234. See Thomas Kelly, Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the Past, 38 Nois 6o,
61 (2004).
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The third creditor, by contrast is an indifferent creditor, with no stake in
the outcome of the case at all. It neither benefits from the debtor's gains nor
is it harmed by the debtor's losses. It nonetheless has governance rights.
The fourth creditor is a Schadenfreude investor. The worse the debtor
does, the greater the payments the fourth creditor will receive on its multiple
swaps. The better the debtor does, the more it has to pay. Also note that the
economic interests of the third and fourth creditors are not affected by
whether they purchased the claim or were the original creditor. The
difference in economic interest is created by the steps that they took to hedge.
1. Proportional Dilution for Hedgers and Shorts
For the indifferent investor and the Schadenfreude investor, the link
between the governance rights and economic interest that forms the basis for
creditor control rights is broken, or worse yet, inverted. The rationale for
giving these creditors voting rights disappears. In these cases, while there is
no reason to disturb the economic bet that the derivative transactions create
(i.e., to subordinate the claim or disallow it), there is every reason to adjust
the voting rights to reflect the economic reality of each creditor.
Accordingly, we propose that a creditor who has hedged some or all of
its exposure should have its voting rights reduced proportionally so that its
governance rights reflect its economic interest. Also, for reasons discussed
below,235 we believe that the bankruptcy policy of equitable treatment
mandates that any control rights belong to the class, not to any individual class
member. Therefore, claims purchased at a discount should have their
governance rights allocated to reflect their basis, which also reserves the value
of the any control premia to the class as a whole. We refer to this governance
allocation as "mark-to-interest," which is the first component of a system we
term "mark-to-market governance."
The conceptual underpinning of "marking-to-interest" is not particularly
radical. Many governance schemes protect the integrity of the democratic
process by policing an identity of interest. Political party primaries often, but
not always, require membership in the relevant party.23 6 Other voting
235. See infra Section V.A.2.
236. See State Primary Election 7pes, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx. The experience in
open primaries is instructive, in that it generally reflects a party choice to seek the most broadly
acceptable (centrist) candidate. Sometimes it works, as with the recent selection, in Mississippi of
Senator Thad Cochran as the Republican senatorial candidate. When faced with a more
conservative Tea Party challenger in the primary, Cochran reached across party lines to normally
Democratic African American voters. See, e.g., Ashley Parker & Jonathan Martin, G.O.P. Senator
Courts Blacks in Mississippi Primary Race, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/o6/21/us/politics/cochran-asking-blacks-to-rescue-him-in-republican-primary.html. The
result was that the relatively more centrist candidate, Cochran, was selected. Mississippi Election
Results, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014, 12:28 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2o
4 /mississippi-elections. Even this was not without controversy, but open primaries also leave open a
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mechanisms that limit franchise based on conflicts of interest include judicial
recusal rules,237 and most directly applicable, recusal rules for interested
directors in corporate transactions.23
8 Even shareholders are subject to
antifraud rules that limit insider trading (reallocating firm value to insiders)
and rules with regard to oppression of minority shareholder issues.23o Thus,
the issue should not be whether we are raising a valid governance concern,
but about whether there is a means of regulation wherein the benefits exceed
the costs.
2. Basis-Allocated Governance Rights: Preserving Equality of Distribution
Our second concern is more complicated, but it starts from the fact,
noted above, that once a debtor becomes insolvent, the changing price of
debt reflects a changing price of governance. In other words, the "one-dollar,
one-vote" principle breaks down. As the price of distressed debt changes, so
does the price of a blocking position or an accepting position. One day a
blocking position could cost $1oo,ooo. The next day it could cost $2oo,ooo.
The problem here is notjust that the value of the blocking position fluctuates,
but so too does its distribution.
The problem is most easily understood in reference to the stock of a
solvent company. A "control premium" attaches to the valuing of having a
controlling stake in the company-the value of the marginal share needed for
control is more than the value of a regular share because it brings with it the
control rights. Yet that marginal share cannot be acquired without also
owning all of the shares short of the final share needed for control. The point
here is that the value of the control premium is distributed unevenly among
shareholders. A controlling block is worth more on a per share basis than a
minority block of shares. And when a company is in play, the first shareholders
to tender to a buyer seeking control can realize on the control premium.
Once the buyer has achieved control, the later tendering shareholders will
not receive the control premium for their shares.
The fact that the control premium is unevenly distributed among
creditors creates a ratable distribution problem that does not exist in equity
markets. Bankruptcy law seeks to lock in the relative positions of creditors as
possibility for abuse, with cross-over voters supporting the least palatable candidate in the other
party's primary so as to improve their party's candidate's chances in the general election. Id.;
Andy Schmookler, Open Primaries: A Wrong Idea, HUFFPOsT (June 15, 2017), https://
www. huffingtonpost.com/andy-schmookler/open-primaries-a-wrong-idb 10471 3 9 6.html.
237. 28 U.S.C. 455 (2012); Litekyv. United States, 5 10 U.S. 540, 541-43, 556 (1994).
238. See, e.g., NASDAQ, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR NASDAQ AND U.S. SUBSIDIARY BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS 1-2 (2016), http://ir.nasdaq.com/static-files/ed2focdi-dgcf- 4 3 2c-8da8-eof87c6d66fi
(effective November 1, 2018).
239. 17 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.]ob- 5 (2018). See generally F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppression of Minority
Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 121 (1987) (describing common causes
of shareholder disputes, efforts to suppress minority shareholders' interests, and ways to combat
shareholder suppression).
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of the petition date.24o Uneven and shifting distribution of the control
premium among members of a class, postpetition, changes the allocation of
the value of governance rights over time. To the extent that these rights have
value, exiting creditors may realize on that value, while remaining creditors
will not.
The best way to think about this is to recognize that the control rights of
a class belong to the whole class equally and are allocated to the class as a
whole, rather than to any individual creditor. Again, having raised the
problem, the question is how to fix it, and whether the fix is worth the cost.
B. THE PROPOSED SorLTION
Conceptually, our proposed solution is simple. Where a creditor has
"hedged" its interest, the voting rights should reflect its actual economic
interest as it applies to the particular creditor class. And, where a creditor has
sold its claim, the governance rights should be discounted to reflect the
creditor's basis.
As discussed above, because claims can be purchased at a discount and
because there are multiple blocking positions in bankruptcy, holdout power
is greater in bankruptcy than outside.24, A key goal of bankruptcy law is to
limit such holdout power.242 Outside of bankruptcy, individual creditors have
the ability to veto any change to their debt obligations.243 In bankruptcy, such
obligations can be modified by a vote of other creditors.244
While we have referred to the adjustment of governance rights through
the shorthand of "mark-to-market," that is not exactly what we are proposing.
A literal marking of economic interest to market would allow a creditor to
vote based on the market value of its claim (excluding the market value
attributable to the voting rights). What we would propose, instead, is a
solution that addresses hedgers and purchasers separately.
For hedgers, we propose marking their claims to their economic interest
("mark-to-interest"). This would entail a proportional dilution of voting rights
based on the extent to which the creditor faces the full risk of its position. For
example, if a creditor has hedged half its risk, its voting rights should be
reduced by 50%.
For claims purchasers, we propose to mark their claim to their purchase
price ("mark-to-basis"). This would entail allocating governance rights based
on the purchase price, instead of the face amount of the debt (which would
still be used for distributional purposes). If a creditor purchased a $2,ooo
240. One of us has developed the issue of equitable distribution of firm value extensively in
a separate manuscript. SeeJacoby &Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 4, at 696-7o6.
241. See supra Part II.
242. SeeLEVITIN, supra note 39, at791, 936.
243. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 46, at 1604.
244. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1126, 1129 (2012).
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claim for $400, it should have voting rights associated with the $400 purchase
price, instead of the $2,ooo debt. The effect of using basis, rather than face
amount is to allow for economic exit, while preserving the value of control for
the class as a whole. Each time a creditor exits, its governance rights would be
reallocated to the entire class.
Marking the claims governance rights to basis largely solves both the
problem of underpaying for a control premium and the problem that the
control premium is not distributed equally across the class. The solution is to
discount the voting rights, but not the distributional rights related to a claim.
A numerical example illustrates the point. If, on the petition date, there
were $1oo in claims in a class, a blocking position would require $33 of claims
and a control position would require $67 of claims. If, for example, one
month into the case, claims were selling for 500 on the dollar, then $33 in
claims could be purchased for $16.50. If the voting rights were marked to
basis, however, $33 in debt purchased for $16.50 would convey only $16.50
in voting rights, but would still represent $3g in distributional rights.
Accordingly, to amass a blocking position would require a purchase of $66 in
face amount at a 50% discount. Whereas distribution rights are allocated by
face amount, voting rights are allocated by basis.
The same marking-to-basis mechanism also largely (though not entirely)
alleviates the problem of unequal distribution. If a claim is purchased at a
50% discount, then the voting rights would be split. Half of the voting rights
would go to the purchaser who purchased for 5 0t on the dollar, while the
remaining half would effectively be reallocated, pro rata, to all claimants
according to their original economic interest.
Thus, with a class of $ioo in claims, a claimant who purchased $66 in
claims for $33 would end up with $66 of distribution rights-two-thirds of the
distribution rights in the class-but it would receive only one-half of voting
rights in the class ($33 of $66), reflecting the claimant's share of the total
basis of the class's claimants.245 Neither would have a control position, but
245. The dollar amount of voting rights can be conceived in three ways, all resulting in the
same percentage allocation of voting rights. First, the claimant can be conceived as having $33
out of a total of $66 in voting rights, because $66 is the total basis for the class ($33 for the
claimant plus $33 for the rest of the class). The result is one half ($33 of $66) of the voting power
goes to the claim purchaser.
Second, we can think of there being a reallocation of the voting premium of one third of
the total votes (representing the difference between the claimant's face amount ($66) and basis
($33)), so that the claimant would get $33 in votes + a 33% premium for a total of $44 and the
other class members would get $33 in votes plus a 33% premium for a total of $44 in votes. The
result again is one half of the voting power ($44 of $88) goes to the claim purchaser.
Third, the claimant can be conceived as having $50 out of a total of $soo in voting ights.
This approach takes the $33 difference between the claimant's face amount ($66) and basis
($33) and reallocates it pro rata to all claimants (including the claim purchaser) on the basis 
of
their basis. The claim purchaser receives one half of the reallocated voting rights ($17) for a total
of $50, while the rest of the class receives one half ($i7) for a total of $50. Yet again, the 
result
is one half of the voting power ($50 of $1oo) goes to the claim purchaser.
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both would have blocking positions and would have to deal with each other.
Purchasing control would be even more difficult. It would be necessary for a
purchaser to purchase four-fifths of the face amount of a class to obtain a
control position of two-thirds of the votes.
In thinking about the impact of such an approach, it is important to
consider what it accomplishes, and what it does not. Mark-to-basis principally
limits the ability of a claims trader to purchase control rights at a discount and
mark-to-interest limits the ability of a creditor to use those rights to the
disadvantage of other similarly situated creditors while creating a benefit
outside the creditor class. For example, a creditor with short options, marked
to interest, could not use its voting rights to the advantage of its derivative
position because its voting rights would be proportionally diluted. A creditor
who purchased a position in a class at a discount, would still be able to vote its
claims, but only to the extent of the amount paid. The logic for hedgers lies
in preserving interest alignment. The logic for traders, again, lies in equal
distribution of the monetary value of control.
C. SOME COMPLICATIONS
One complication for the proportional dilution rule is that hedging
comes in many forms.24 6 The principle of proportional dilution is more
difficult to administer in situations where the value of control to the
conflicting interest is more difficult to value. Three examples have been
mentioned above: (1) secured creditors' deficiency claims or other creditors
who have invested across the capital structure; (2) landlords; and
(3) competitors.47 An undersecured creditor will frequently have a large
deficiency claim.248 The right to vote that claim as a member of the unsecured
creditor class may create significant opportunities for the senior creditor to
capture value that it does not own. Imagine that two secured creditors have
liens on assets of the debtor worth $3 million and claims of $io million. The
debtor has other assets worth $1 million, and unsecured creditors with claims
of $3 million. The secured creditors have the power to control the unsecured
creditor class through their unsecured deficiency claims. They could thereby
vote to support a plan with an artificially low valuation that transferred
ownership of the debtor to the secured parties while giving a very small cash
In any case, the claim purchaser only ends up with one half of the voting rights in the class.
Mathematically there is no difference between disregarding the voting rights reflected by the
difference between face and basis and redistributing them pro rata on the basis of basis, because
the pro rata redistribution, by definition, does not affect the ratio of the numerator and
denominator in the voting. For bankruptcy law purposes it makes no difference which calculation
is used.
246. See supra Section II.A.
247. See supra Sections II.E.4 -. 6.
248. See II U.S.C. § 5 o6(b) (providing for bifurcation of undersecured claims into a secured
claim for the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the deficiency).
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payout to the unsecured class. Similarly, a landlord may prefer to recover
control of its space to recovering on a breach claim or receiving cure
payments over time. Finally, a competitor might favor liquidation even if it is
not value maximizing on its claim because the demise of a competitor would
have considerable economic value.
Unlike the challenges of modern financial instruments and distressed
debt trading, these conflicts are not novel. Indeed, they are the genesis of the
existing remedies.249 Separate classification of the deficiency claim means that
the other unsecured creditors will still be able to accept as a class if they
choose to. The deficiency class will not accept, and cram-down will be
necessary, but this would be true even if the secured creditor alone were to
vote no. The main difference is that if there is an objecting unsecured class,
the absolute priority rule will apply, and equity will have to be wiped out.
25 0 As
for the landlord or the competitor, designation of votes may be an adequate
remedy, as the conflict of interest should be readily apparent. In each of these
situations, the appropriate dilution may be difficult to calculate, and while the
principle may be operating, existing remedies might be better suited to the
problem.
In short, we would only apply our approach to hedgers and traders. It
seems that proportional and relative dilution are remedies that work
particularly well for hedged and/or traded claims, but for the other types of
conflicts we have discussed, existing remedies may be sufficient.
A second complication arises when governance rights are discounted
based on basis. The result of one claim's governance rights being discounted
is that existing claimants may have their governance rights enhanced.
Blocking positions may emerge where previously they did not exist. On the
one hand, this seems unfair, but when applied in actual cases, it shows how
the two prongs of mark-to-market governance work together by permitting
economic exit and preventing the sale of a control premium. To the extent
that a class has governance rights within a Chapter 11 case, that right belongs
to the class, not one subset of creditors who choose to sell into a developing
control block because the right exists only by virtue of the existence of the
class. The effect of calculating governance rights based on basis is that the
control premium is constantly reallocated among the existing creditors. Since
the control premium cannot be purchased, each time there is a sale of a claim,
any discounted control rights are reallocated to the other members of the
class to be shared equally. This solves the equity problem. It also reinforces
the importance of proportional dilution for hedgers. A purchaser who is
purchasing an economic interest will have to rely on the other creditors to
249. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 411 (1977) (noting that the good faith voting
requirement of is U.S.C. § 1 126(e) is to address the situation of when a creditor holds claims in
multiple classes).
250. 11 U.S.C. § I 1 2 9 (b) (2).
IVOI- 104:18571 91x4
ONE DOLLAR, ONE VOTE 1915
exercise their rights on behalf of the class in a non-conflicted manner. As a
result, robust disclosure and mechanisms to retain interest alignment would
be a prerequisite to any claim's liquidity. While it might seem farfetched to
think that investors would buy economic claims stripped of their voting rights,
a number of recent tech offerings have included shares with no voting
power.2 5' The lack of voting rights has not been an impediment to marketing
the shares.
D. PURCHASE OF SECURED PoSITIONS
As noted above, the right to credit bid can be used by a secured creditor
to capture value in excess of its secured claim. The Free Lance-Star case
illustrates a means for solving this problem, which we call "mark-to-value." In
that case, the court concluded, however, that the claims purchaser did not
have a lien on all of the corporate assets, and hence on the corporation's
enterprise value.252 Accordingly, the court limited the creditor's right to credit
bid to an amount based solely on the value of the assets on which it had a valid
lien.253 The effect was to limit the likelihood that the debt overhang would
chill the bidding at the sale and to preserve for later resolution the question
of how much of the firm's value was allocable to the secured creditor's claim.
The Free Lance-Star ruling has been quite controversial. 254 However, the
court's action can be viewed as an elegant move to mark the secured creditor's
claim to market. The secured creditor's strategy in Free Lance-Star was an
attempt to lever the value of the liened assets into ownership and control of
the company. In short, the claim purchaser seemed to think that the secured
claim carried with it control rights and hence a control premium. The court's
decision limited the governance rights (specifically, the right to credit bid) to
the liquidation value of the creditor's collateral and preserved disputes about
allocation of value for later.255
We believe that limiting a secured creditor's ability to credit bid to the
amount of its allowed secured claim ("mark-to-value") is an important third
component of a system of "mark-to-market governance." Indeed, asJanger has
explained elsewhere, the principle is already required by Sections 506, 3 6 3 (k)
and 1129(b) (2) (A).25 6 Sales procedures are an important part of governance
251. James Rufus Koren & Paresh Dave, Snap Won't Give Shareholders Voting Rights. For That,
It's Being Shunned by a Major Stock Index, L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2017, 10:40 AM), https://
www.1atimes.com/business/la-fi-snap-russell-indices-20170
7 2 7-story.html. Notably, bankruptcy
law requires any plan of reorganization to include a provision in the charter of the reorganized
debtor prohibiting such nonvoting equity securities. See 11 U.S.C. § i 123(a) (6).
252. In re Free Lance-Star Publ'g Co. of Fredericksburg, 512 B.R. 798, 807-08 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 2014).
253. Id. (discussing valuation methodology).
254. Tyler P. Brown et al., Secured Lender's Credit-Bid Capped in Free Lance-Star, 33 AM. BANKR.
INsT.J. *1, *3 (2014)-
255. In relee Lance-Star, 512 BR. at 8o8.
256. EdwardJ.Janger, The Logic and Limits ofLiens, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 6o-o6.
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in bankruptcy, and the ability to credit bid beyond the value of one's collateral
confers the power to chill cash bids.257 Just as any control premium belongs
to a class, not an individual creditor, secured creditors should not be able to
use their power over assets to distort the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme
including the relationship between asset-based and firm-based claims. Just as
with hedgers and discount buyers, the problem of secured creditors
attempting to credit bid on assets of the debtor firm that are not part of their
collateral can be solved by preserving the "relative governance rights"
associated with a claim, while leaving the distributional rights intact.
E. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
In sum, ensuring that creditors are given governance rights in
accordance with their economic interest in the debtor and limiting their
ability to use or accumulate control rights to harm the firm or distort the
Code's distributional priorities is a theme that underlies a variety of existing
remedies under the Bankruptcy Code. Separate classification, designation of
votes, and subordination of claims are all existing tools in the court's
repertoire.
In this Article, however, we have identified three contexts where modern
claims trading demands novel remedies.
* First, the existing regime is inadequate and needs to be
modified to account for the possibility of positions hedged
with derivatives (mark-to-interest).
* Second, purchasing a claim at a discount from face amount
may increase the power of holdouts and violates the
bankruptcy policy of equality of treatment (mark-to-basis).
* And third, where secured creditors are involved, limiting
the right to credit bid to the value of the collateral-already
occurring in some cases-can be accomplished by applying
Section 3 6 3 (k) (mark-to-value).
Each context necessitates a recalibration of control rights to achieve a
mark-to-market governance system that reflects bankruptcy's underlying
principles of value-maximizing governance and equitable distribution. In the
next section we describe how this might be done.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
The value of any creditor's position in a bankruptcy case has two
components: the economic rights to a distribution and the governance rights
that help to determine how to maximize the value of the firm's assets.
Claimants may attempt to use their governance rights to enhance their
257. Id.
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distribution at the expense of other claimants or the firm by separating their
economic rights from their governance rights. Claims trading also allows
selling claimants to sell control linked shares at a premium, while allowing
claims purchasers to purchase blocking positions at a discount. The goal of
this Article is to reestablish the connection between the claimant's economic
position and its governance rights through three practical approaches:
(1) proportional dilution of voting rights for all creditors that are hedged;
(2) discounting the governance rights of purchased claims to the claimant's
basis; and (3) by limiting the secured creditor's right to credit bid to the
estimated value of its collateral.
In our view there is statutory authority for a partial implementation of
our approach under current law in the Code, though the infrastructure would
need to be created at the beginning of a case by order, local rule, or
amendment to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In this section, we
identify the limits of existing law and propose a practical approach to
implementation mark-to-interest and mark-to-basis governance. In our view
there is existing legal authority, under Section 1 126 of the Bankruptcy Code,
to designate shorts, though not, except perhaps under Section 105, to dilute
partial hedges or claims traders. In our view, there is already authority, under
Sections 363 (k) and 5o6 to limit credit bidding to the allowed secured claim,
as illustrated by Free Lance-Star.258
A. IMPLEMENTING AIARK-TO-INTEREST AND MARK-TO-BASIS
For the partially hedged, or even indifferent creditor, it would be difficult
to characterize a vote as case in bad faith under Section 12 6(e). However,
for a true Schadenfreude investor, where the interest of the investor and the
firm have diverged, then bad faith can be inferred from the conflict of interest
itself. Designation (or equitable subordination) seems an appropriate
response, and one that could be implemented immediately. Our more
aggressive proposals, we think, would require an amendment to the Code.
That said, we do think that both a modest version, as well also our more robust
version, could be implemented by the same procedural mechanism.
A mark-to-market regime, in both its forms, would require a more robust
disclosure system than currently exists. As noted above, Rule 2019 currently
requires ad hoc committee members and official committee members to
disclose more about their economic position than just the face value of their
claim.259 They must also disclose when they purchased their "disclosable
economic interest" in the debtor by quarter if it was purchased in the past
year.26 0 Disclosure of the nature and amount of the interest as well as the
general time when it was purchased can serve as a rough proxy for disclosure
258. See infra Section VI.B.
259. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
260. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(C) (2) (B)-(C).
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of the price paid for the interest; for example, it is feasible for parties to
discover roughly what a total return swap on the debtor would have cost two
quarters ago.
Mark-to-market governance would necessitate a similar type of disclosure
to Rule 2019, but it would have to apply to all claimants.
61 Beyond the Rule
2019 disclosure content, for mark-to-market governance to work, such
creditors would also have to disclose the consideration they paid for their
claims, something that is likely to be fiercely resisted because it will enable
outside observers to calculate the successfulness of different investors'
strategies.
The timing of these disclosures is important. To the extent that Chapter
1 1 expects smaller creditors to free-ride by watching the behavior of larger
creditors, the only way to avoid false signaling is to require periodic updating
of these disclosures, including whenever there is a material change in their
disclosable interest.
Most importantly, however, we would require a final disclosure at the
time of a distribution under a plan, after governance rights have been
exercised. This would allow the claims agent tabulating ballots to apply the
mark-to-market principles to each claim. Finally, because claims may be
traded even after voting, a creditor with a blocking position might vote against
the plan, and then build a short position based on the knowledge of its vote.
Thus, creditors who have voted on a plan should be required to make a
certification as of the effective date of the plan that there has been no material
change in its economic interest. If there has been a material change, then the
court should have the power to recalculate the governing majorities, and, if
necessary, revoke plan confirmation.2s
261. Our concerns about non-voting governance rights do not extend to Chapter 7, where
creditors exert minimal governance influence.
We recognize that there are practical complications in marking claims to market when
those claims are held indirectly. For example, most secured loans are syndicated, with a single
claim filed by the agent bank for the syndicate. Would the disclosure regime we propose apply to
each syndicate member, or would it be aggregated? How would a reduction in voting rights for
the agent bank in the bankruptcy because of individual syndicate members' positions be
addressed within the syndicate's own internal voting structure? The same problem emerges for
participations and securitizations-is the disclosure requirement on the agent bank or servicer?
Or is it on the beneficial interest holders? And for bonds, would the duty be on the indenture
trustee? If so, how would the disclosure requirement work given that the trustee likely knows only
the names of the brokerages that hold the bonds in "street name" for the ultimate investors, who
might themselves be funds with their own investors?
262. Federal securities law takes a different approach. The Williams Act requires public
disclosure when a stockholder accumulates a significantly large position to be able to begin
affecting governance rights. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (d) (2012). This disclosure requirement alerts other
shareholders that they should demand a control premium when they sell their stock. The negative
implication is that absent a Williams Act warning, stock is sold without control rights, meaning
that the stock price is discounted to reflect the lack of control rights.
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B. IMPLEMENTING MARK-TO-VALUE
For secured creditors, as noted above, the architecture we suggest has
already been partially implemented in a number of cases using Section
3 6 3 (k), and may be required by Sections 506 and 112 9 (b) (2) (A).263 Section
363 (k) allows the court to limit the power to credit bid at a bankruptcy sale
"for cause."2 6 4 In Free Lance-Star, and a similar case Fisker Automotive Holdings,
secured creditors who purchased their claims had their right to credit bid
limited to the amount they had paid for the purchased debt.2 65 This did not,
in either case, determine their distributional rights, but it did facilitate
bidding by other parties at the auction by limiting the effect of the
overhanging credit bid.
In both of these cases, however, the court's decision to limit the right to
credit bid was accompanied by findings that the creditor had engaged in
inequitable behavior.2 6 6 Many commenters have taken the view that those two
courts were relying on egregious inequitable behavior by the bidding
creditors.2 6 7 It is certainly true that the behavior of the secured creditors in
both cases played a role. However, it was important to the court in Free Lance-
Star that the bidding creditor did not have a perfected lien on all of the assets
being sold, and, more importantly, the court was particularly upset by the way
in which the creditor tried to leverage its lien rights into control rights.
Indeed, that was the inequitable behavior identified, and the remedy was to
mark the "control rights" to market.2 68
In our view, the lesson of Free Lance-Star and Fisker is broader than is
commonly understood. Whenever a debtor is conducting an all asset sale, it is
not by any means clear that the incumbent secured lender has a perfected
lien on all of the firm's value.2 6 9 As such, there will often be cause to limit the
right to credit bid to the value of the secured creditor's lien-to mark the bids
to market.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, modem trading technology increases the liquidity of debt,
and this includes distressed debt. As such, debt now trades in a manner similar
to equity securities. Because bankruptcy gives governance rights to creditors,
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the empty voting problem that has been observed in modern mergers and
acquisition practice appears to have migrated to the bankruptcy forum.
We believe that matching governance rights to economic interest is the
proper way to align investment incentives such that firm value is most likely to
be maximized by its stakeholders. Just because a rule is likely to be wealth
maximizing does not mean that it will not be controversial. When the
bankruptcy court in Northwest Airlines found in 2007 that the then current
version of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2oig required an ad hoc
group of creditors to make various disclosures, including the amount paid for
any "claims or interests" in the debtor, 270 the reaction from distressed debt
investors was quick and furious.271
There is no denying that disclosure obligations would lead to a loss of
liquidity of bankruptcy claims. Some creditors would not want to be subject to
a disclosure requirement both because of its administrative burdens and
potential liability and because of the concern about revealing information
about their trading strategies and success. Indeed, we recognize that the
changes we propose may make certain trading strategies less profitable.
But even if our proposal has a chilling effect on the claims trading
market, that should not be dispositive in terms of evaluating its merits. Claims
trading has important benefits, 272 but those benefits are only realized if the
market in which claims are traded are open and transparent and if
governance rights are properly distributed. Our approach does not limit
"economic exit." It merely reestablishes the link between governance rights
and economic interest. Indeed, fixing this problem in bankruptcy helps limit
the problem outside of bankruptcy. If misallocated control rights are lost in
bankruptcy, they lose value outside of bankruptcy, so there is less incentive to
engage in empty creditor behavior overall.
Mark-to-market governance on the basis of "one dollar, one vote"
provides a mechanism for reducing the distortions that empty voting can
cause in bankruptcy while preserving the benefits of the claims trading market
as relates to purely economic rights.
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